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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE
I.

INTRODUCTION

This criminal procedure and evidence survey covers cases appearing in
the New Mexico Bar Bulletin between July 1, 1990 and August 1, 1991.
Parts II and III are arranged to follow the order of the events in a
criminal proceeding. Part IV covers recent New Mexico cases concerning
the rules of evidence and standards of review.
II. SEARCHES, SEIZURES, AND MIRANDA WARNINGS
A.

Searches Conducted Pursuant to a Warrant

1. Search
The fourth
sons, houses,
zures," and

Warrants
amendment of the United States Constitution protects "perpaper, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seirequires that search warrants be "supported by Oath or

affirmation, and particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the

persons or things to be seized."' The New Mexico 2Constitution also
guarantees against unreasonable searches and seizures.
The New Mexico Supreme Court Rules provide that "[a] warrant shall
issue only on a sworn written statement of the facts showing probable
cause for issuing the warrant." 3 During the survey period, New Mexico
appellate courts considered the existence of probable cause in search
warrants based on affidavits containing hearsay testimony provided by

as a basis
informants. 4 In judging the sufficiency of hearsay testimony
5
for an affidavit, New Mexico employs a two-part test. First, a court
must determine whether the affidavit contains sufficient facts indicating
the basis for the affiant's knowledge. 6 Second, a court must determine

1. U.S. CoNsr. amend IV.
2. N.M. CONST. art. II, § 10, provides that:
The people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes, and effects, from
unreasonable searches and seizures, and no warrant to search any place, or seize
any person or thing, shall issue without describing the place to be searched, or the
persons or things to be seized, nor without a written showing of probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation.
3. N.M. R. Cim. P. 5-211(A).
4. State.v. Hernandez, Ill N.M. 226, 804 P.2d 417 (Ct. App. 1990); State v. Wisdom, 110
N.M. 772, 800 P.2d 206 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 110 N.M. 749, 779 P.2d 1121 (1990).
5. The New Mexico test for sufficiency of facts contained in an affidavit is more stringent
than the federal test. For a more detailed discussion of the differences in the two tests, see Survey,
Criminal Procedure, 21 N.M.L. REV. 624 (1991).
6. State v. Cordova, 109 N.M. 211, 213, 784 P.2d 30, 32 (1989).
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whether the affidavit sets forth sufficient facts indicating the veracity of
the informant. 7 This test is codified in Supreme Court Rule 5-211(E).8
In State v. Wisdom, 9 the defendant was charged with possession of
controlled substances, receiving stolen property, and possession of firearms
by a felon. 0 Wisdom moved to suppress evidence obtained in searches
conducted pursuant to several search warrants." The same affidavit was
submitted to support each warrant,12 and was based in part on hearsay
provided by unnamed informants. 3 The district court found the affidavits
insufficient to meet the requirements of Rule 5-211(E) and the evidence
5
was suppressed.' 4 The state appealed.
In reversing the district court's finding, the New Mexico Court of
Appeals first considered whether the affidavits established the basis of
the informant's knowledge. 6 The court rejected Wisdom's paragraph-byparagraph analysis of the affidavits and instead read them as a whole
and gave them a nontechnical construction.' 7 The court agreed with the
state that, when read as a whole, the affidavits clearly indicated that the
informant was basing his information on personal knowledge." The court
then held that the veracity of the informants was also established by the
affidavits. 19 The assertion that the informants had been reliable on at
least three other occasions, taken with the rest of the affidavits' information, was sufficient for the court to conclude that an issuing magistrate
could infer the credibility of the informants. 20
In State v. Hernandez,2' an affidavit in support of a search warrant
stated that "witnesses observed" Hernandez in the vicinity of a burglary. 22
The affidavit also stated that police investigating the crime scene concluded

7. Id.
8. N.M. R. CRI.. P. 5-211(E). This rule provides that:
.As used in this rule, "probable cause" shall be based upon substantial evidence,
which may be hearsay in whole or in part, provided there is a substantial basis
for believing the source of the hearsay to be credible and for believing that there
is a factual basis for the information furnished. Before ruling on a request for a
warrant the court may require the affiant to appear personally and may examine
under oath the affiant and any witnesses he may produce, provided that such
additional evidence shall be reduced to writing, supported by oath or affirmation
and served with the warrant.
See also N.M. R. CraM. P. 6-208(F), 7-208(E), 8-207(F).
9. 110 N.M. 772, 800 P.2d 206 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 110 N.M. 749, 779 P.2d 1121 (1990).
10. Id. at 773, 800 P.2d at 207.
11.Id.
12. Id. at 775, 800 P.2d at 209.
13. Id.at 773, 800 P.2d at 207.
14. Id. at 776, 800 P.2d at 210.
15. Id. at 773, 800 P.2d at 207.
16. Id. at 776, 800 P.2d at 210.
17. Id. (citing State v. Perea, 85 N.M. 505, 513 P.2d 1287 (Ct. App. 1973)).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 777, 800 P.2d at 211.
20. Id. at 776-77, 800 P.2d at 210-11. The court rejected Wisdom's argument that the affidavit
was insufficient to establish credibility in that it did not specify the number of informants nor
when or to whom the information was given. Id. at 777, 800 P.2d at 211.
21. Ill N.M. 226, 804 P.2d 417 (Ct. App. 1990).
22. Id.at 227, 804 P.2d at 418.
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that the perpetrator had cut himself, and his blood and several dropped
23
stolen items created a trail toward Hernandez's residence. The affidavit4
hand.
Hernandez's
further asserted that police observed a fresh cut on
A search warrant was issued, and the trial court denied Hernandez's
motion to quash the warrant and suppress the evidence found pursuant
to it.25

On appeal, Hernandez argued that the affidavit was insufficient to
establish probable cause.2 The state contended that the affidavit established that the witnesses were "citizen-informers," and that as such their
credibility should be presumed.2 7 The court of appeals did not have to
reach the issue of presumption of credibility. Instead, the court concluded
that the status of the witnesses could not be determined because the
information was not at all corroborated.2 Consequently, the29 court held
that "it is virtually impossible to find the hearsay reliable." The court
further held that the trail of stolen items, the bloodstains at the scene,
insufficient by themselves
and the cut observed on Hernandez' hand were
30
to establish probable cause for the warrant.
Taken together, Wisdom and Hernandez both expand and hinder a
magistrate's discretion in issuing search warrants. Under Wisdom, a
magistrate may infer the reliability of an informant even though the basis
for that inference is not laid out in detail in the affidavit. Under Hernandez, however, the establishment of an informant's credibility requires
that an affidavit at least provide some sort of corroboration of the given
information.
2. Wiretaps
In addition to searches of persons' physical property, New Mexico
allows an "interference with communications" exception to privacy that
3
includes interference with telephone communications. ' The issuance of
an order for such an interference, or "wiretap," must be based on
probable cause that the wiretap will obtain evidence of the commission
of certain crimes.3 2 Every wiretap order "shall contain a provision that

23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.

27. Id.at 228, 804 P.2d at 419 (citations omitted).
28. Id. at 229, 804 P.2d at 420. The information might have been sufficiently corroborated had
the affidavit disclosed the witnesses identities, observation, or discussions with the police. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.

31. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-12-1 (Repl. Pamp. 1984). The entirety of the New Mexico wiretap
statute is found in N.M. STAT. ANN. sections 30-12-1 to -11.
32. New Mexico Statutes Annotated section 30-12-2 states that:
An ex parte order for wiretapping, eavesdropping or the interception of any wire
or oral communication may be issued by any judge of a district court upon application
of the attorney general or a district attorney, stating that there is probable cause

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 22

the authorization to intercept . . . shall be conducted in such a way as
to minimize the interception under this act and shall terminate upon
attainment of the authorized objective .... -"3 Any aggrieved person
may move to suppress the contents of any wiretap on the grounds that
"the interception was not made in conformity with the order of authorization or approval."
In State v. Manes," the court of appeals considered as a matter of
first impression, the issue of the propriety of minimization during a
wiretap.16 An order was issued for the police to tap the home telephone
of Manes, who was suspected of drug trafficking.3 7 The order required
that the intercepted communications be minimized, that a weekly report
be submitted describing the police officers' efforts at minimization, and
that a list of innocent callers be supplied to the court.3 The officers'
minimization process consisted of listening to a call for up to a minute
to determine if it was incriminating, and if it was not the interception
would cease for one to two minutes. 39 This process would then continue
until the call was finished. 40 The police testified that they could not be
certain that a call from any specific person would be innocent, and no
list of innocent callers was provided to the court.4 ' An incriminating
conversation led to Manes's arrest and conviction. 42 Manes argued on
appeal that the police had failed to minimize the tapped phone calls of
his wife, mother, and children.4 3
Noting that the New Mexico and federal wiretap statutes are substantially similar, the court of appeals looked to federal minimization cases
for guidance.M In so doing, the court held that to prevail Manes had
to show a pattern, rather than merely isolated examples, of interception
of innocent calls. 45 The court then concluded that the minimization

to believe that:
A. evidence may be obtained of the commission of:
(1) the crime of murder, kidnapping, extortion, robbery, trafficking or distribution
of controlled substances or bribery of a witness;
(2) the crime of burglary, aggravated burglary, criminal sexual penetration, arson,
mayhem, receiving stolen property or commercial gambling, if punishable by imprisonment for more than one year; or
(3) an organized criminal conspiracy to commit any of the aforementioned crimes;
or
B. the communication, conversation or discussion is itself an element of any of
the above specified crimes.
33. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-12-6 (Repl. Pamp. 1984).
34. Id. § 30-12-8(B)(2).
35. 112 N.M. 161, 812 P.2d 1309 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 112 N.M. 77, 811 P.2d 575; cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 381 (1991).
36. Id. at 165, 812 P.2d at 1313.
37. Id. at 163, 812 P.2d at 1311.
38. Id. at 164, 812 P.2d at 1312.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 165, 812 P.2d at 1313.
45. Id.
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procedures followed by the police were properly conducted.6 The court
further held that other factors, such as the wiretap's short life span, the
possibility of Manes being involved in a widespread conspiracy, the use
of coded language in the intercepted calls, and the close judicial supervision
of the operation 4 7 showed "that the minimization was reasonable under
the totality of the circumstances."'4
Manes is an important case because it establishes the police practices
necessary to constitute valid wiretap minimization. In practical terms,
this decision should be helpful to prosecutors using wiretap evidence
because it allows for a measure of flexibility in wiretap operations, as
shown by the court's forgiveness of "officer oversight" that technically
violated the wiretap order.4 9 Moreover, by looking for guidance from
and deciding consistently with federal interpretations of similar statutes,
the court of appeals has placed New Mexico in the federal mainstream
on the issue of minimization.5
Warrantless Searches
Situations often arise that compel the police to make searches without
warrants. Such warrantless searches "are per se unreasonable unless they
5'
fall within certain well-defined exceptions to the warrant requirement."
The survey period saw New Mexico appellate courts consider many of
the search warrant exceptions.
B.

1. Inventory
Police inventory searches, which are reasonable if they are made for
the protection of the owner's property or to protect police from false
crimes or potential danger, are recognized in New Mexico as an exception
3
to warrantless searches.5 2 In State v. Boswell, Boswell was arrested in
a grocery store for shoplifting. 4 Boswell produced identification for the
police from his wallet and then accidentally left the wallet on a cabinet
in the store. 5 He was then taken to the police station for booking, at
5 6
which time it was realized the wallet had been left behind. Although

46. Id. at 166-67, 812 at 1314-15.
47. The court found that "the extent of judicial supervision was extensive enough to render the
officers' oversight regarding developing and presenting a formal list of names or telephone numbers
of innocent parties to the judge, as mentioned in the wiretap order, inconsequential." Id. Thus,
the wiretap operation was reasonable even though it admittedly "was not made in conformity with
the order of authorization or approval." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-12-8(B)(3).
48. Manes, 112 N.M. at 167, 812 P.2d at 1315.
49. Id.
50. This is especially true in light of the fact that certiorari was denied in this case by both
the New Mexico and the United States Supreme Courts. State v. Manes, 112 N.M. 77, 812 P.2d
1309 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 112 N.M. 77, 811 P.2d 575; cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 381 (1991).
51. State v. Crenshaw, 105 N.M. 329, 332, 732 P.2d 431, 434 (Ct. App. 1986).
52. State v. Ruffino, 94 N.M. 500, 612 P.2d 1311 (1980).
53. 111 N.M. 240, 804 P.2d 1059 (1991) [hereinafter Boswell I].
54. Id. at 241, 804 P.2d at 1060.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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Boswell told the arresting officer a friend would get the wallet for him,
the officer went back to the store to retrieve it. 7 The officer found the
5
wallet, searched it at the store, and discovered drugs in it.
s The officer
testified that he retrieved the wallet so that it would not be lost, and
searched it pursuant to police procedure.5 9 As a result of this search, a
blotter of LSD was discovered and Boswell was convicted of drug possession with intent to distribute.60
The court of appeals reversed Boswell's conviction, 6' holding that the
search did not fall under the inventory exception because the wallet "was
not part of the effects on his person at the time of the booking." 62 The
court further held that there was no "reasonable nexus" to prompt the
officer to retrieve the wallet because "It]here was no evidence the police
officer suspected that evidence of shoplifting was concealed" in it.63
The New Mexico Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and
upheld the conviction." The supreme court held that inventory searches
are lawful if police have control of the searched object, if the inventory
is made pursuant to police procedure, and if the search is reasonable. 65
The court then focused on whether the police controlled the wallet, "i.e.,
was there a reasonable nexus between Boswell's arrest and the seizure
of the wallet?" 66 In its analysis, the court found that "[tihe state interests
justifying an inventory constitute an independent basis for the reasonableness of the search." 67 Thus, the court held that an "incident to arrest
theory" is not needed for inventory searches."
In addition, the court concluded that "[p]robable cause is not required
to justify an inventory search." 69 Instead, the "reasonable nexus" between
the arrest and the seizure of the wallet was found in "the need to
safeguard defendant's property from loss and to protect the police from
liability and charges of negligence.'' 7° The court reasoned that this was
not a case where the wallet would have been safe if left at the store or
where it could have been immediately placed by Boswell in secure custody. 7' Consequently, the court held that the governmental interests for

57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 242 n.1, 804 P.2d 1061 n.l.
60. Id. at 241, 804 P.2d at 1060.
61. State v. Boswell, 110 N.M. 190, 793 P.2d 1343 (Ct. App. 1989) [hereinafter Boswell 1].
62. Id. at 193, 793 P.2d at 1346.
63. Id.
64. Boswell II,111 N.M. at 245, 804 P.2d at 1064.
65. Id. at 241, 804 P.2d at 1060.
66. Id. at 242, 804 P.2d at 1061.
67. Id. at 243, 804 P.2d at 1062. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on Illinois v.
Lafayette, which held that "[t]o determine whether the search ... was unreasonable we must
'balanc[e] its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of
legitimate governmental interests."' Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 645 (1983) (quoting Delaware
v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979)); see Boswell 11, I11 N.M. at 243 n.3, 804 P.2d at 1062 n.3.
68. Boswell II,111 N.M. at 244, 804 P.2d at 1063.
69. Id. at 243, 804 P.2d at 1062.
70. Id. at 244, 804 P.2d at 1063.
71. Id.
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justified the officer's unauthorized search and seizure
inventory searches
72
of the wallet.
The decision in Boswell H could be very helpful to future police
inventory searches. Previously, New Mexico inventory search cases only
involved impounded vehicles, which had been held to have a reduced
73
expectation of privacy due to their inherent mobility. With Boswell II,
however, the inventory exception has been extended to a defendant's
personal effects, even if those effects are not on or near the defendant.
As long as there is the need for the police to protect the defendant's
property and to protect themselves from negligence actions, there exists
the "reasonable nexus" needed to justify such a search and seizure.
2. Exigent Circumstances and Plain View
New Mexico recognizes an exigent circumstances exception to the search
warrant requirement. 74 An exigent circumstance is defined in part as "an
emergency situation requiring swift action to prevent imminent danger
to life or serious damage to property . . . . 7 New Mexico also allows
for warrantless seizures of items in plain view of police officers if, among
are lawfully in the position from which they
other factors, "the officers
' 76
evidence."
the
observe
In State v. Calloway7 7 the fire department responded to a fire at
Calloway's residence.7 8 A fire official, investigating the cause of the fire,
79
saw handguns, laboratory glassware, and chemicals. The official called
in a police impact officer, who in turn called in a police chemist to
0 The impact officer was told
determine how to handle the chemicals
that the scene was not safe, and he subsequently seized the chemicals,
81
the drug lab paraphernalia, the handguns, and a briefcase. Calloway's
motion to suppress this evidence was denied by the trial court, and he
was convicted of drug trafficking. 82
On appeal, Calloway argued that there were no exigent circumstances
justifying the officer's search because by the time he arrived the fire was
83
out and a search for the origin of the fire had already been completed.
Calloway further argued that because the officer's intrusion was invalid,

72. Id.
73. Ruffino, 94 N.M. at 502, 612 P.2d at 1313; see also State v. Williams, 97 N.M. 634, 642
P.2d 1093, cert. denied, 495 U.S. 845 (1982).
74. State v. Copeland, 105 N.M. 27, 31, 727 P.2d 1342, 1346 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 104
N.M. 702, 726 P.2d 856 (1986).
75. Id.
76. State v. Luna, 93 N.M. 773, 779, 606 P.2d 183, 188 (1980). In addition, the evidence must
be discovered inadvertently, and the incriminating nature of the evidence must be immediately
apparent. Id.
77. 111 N.M. 47, 801 P.2d 117 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 111 N.M. 77, 801 P.2d 659 (1990).
78. Id. at 48, 801 P.2d at 118.
79. Id.
80. Id.

81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 49, 801 P.2d at 119.
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the seizure of the evidence did not fall under the plain view doctrine. 84
In affirming the conviction, the court of appeals held that the presence
of the hazardous chemicals constituted the exigent circumstance for the
warrantless entry into Calloway's residence. 85 The court then held that
because the entry was valid, the plain view doctrine applied to the
chemicals, paraphernalia, and handguns, and that the briefcase was properly seized and searched to determine if it also contained hazardous
materials.8 6 Additionally, the court concluded that the officer's statements
that he entered the residence to investigate a drug lab were irrelevant
because "objective conditions rather than an officer's subjective intentions
determine whether exigent circumstances exist.'"
3. Consent
New Mexico also recognizes the voluntary signing of a consent to
search form as validating evidence obtained in a warrantless search." In
State v. Munoz,89 police learned from witnesses at the scene of a burglary
that persons leaving the scene with stolen property had entered a residential
address.9° When officers arrived at the address, Ms. Duran informed
them that she was the resident. 9' The residence was in fact a duplex with
a common interior door. 92 After an initial refusal, Ms. Duran ultimately
signed a consent to search form. 93 As a result of this search, the police
found and arrested Munoz, who was hiding in an attic with several stolen
items. 94
The trial court denied Munoz's motion to suppress the evidence obtained
in the search, holding that he had no expectation of privacy in the
premises and therefore had no standing to challenge the search. 95 On
appeal, Munoz argued that he was the sublessee of the other half of the
duplex and that as such he did have a privacy interest in the residence
that required the police to obtain his consent before they could conduct
their search.96 As evidence for this Munoz pointed to the fact that Ms.
Duran testified at trial that she sublet the duplex to him.97
In rejecting Munoz's argument, the court of appeals found that substantial evidence supported the trial court's finding that Munoz had no
reasonable privacy expectation in the duplex. 98 The court noted that police
84. Id. at 50, 801 P.2d at 120.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 50-51, 801 P.2d at 120-21.
87. Id. at 50, 801 P.2d at 120.
88. State v. Cohen, 103 N.M. 558, 711 P.2d 3 (1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1158 (1986).
89. 111 N.M. 118, 802 P.2d 23 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, III N.M. 136, 802 P.2d 645 (1990).
90. Id. at 119, 802 P.2d at 24.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 120, 802 P.2d at 25.
96. Id. at 119, 802 P.2d at 24.
97. Id. at 120, 802 P.2d at 25.
98. Id.
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testified that Ms. Duran told them at the scene that the other side of
the duplex was vacant, that this statement was reinforced by the fact
that the interior door was open upon their search, and that Munoz had
told police that he lived in another city.w The court held that, when
confronted with conflicting evidence, the trial court was°°allowed to believe
police testimony over that of Ms. Duran or Munoz.'
In State v. Bedolla,'0 police received an anonymous tip that persons
in a purple Nissan truck with California license plates were dealing drugs
out of a motel room.'02 While the police were staking out the motel,
three people in a purple Nissan truck pulled up, went into a motel room,
following the truck for a quarter
came out, and drove away. 03 After
°
mile, the police stopped the truck.' At this time, the police° had observed
no criminal activity either at the motel or in the truck." Bedolla, one
of the men in the truck, was questioned by Officer Lara.'06 Lara told
Bedolla he was investigating the tip, that he would need a warrant to
search the motel room, and that he felt he had enough probable cause
to obtain that warrant.'1 Bedolla and the police went back to the motel,
he was read his Miranda rights, he signed a consent to search form,
and the room was then searched.'0 Drugs were found pursuant to the
search and Bedolla was convicted for possession with intent to distribute

cocaine.109
Bedolla appealed, contending that his consent and the evidence obtained
therefrom should have been suppressed because the police illegally stopped
his truck." 0 The state argued that New Mexico follows the rule that "a
voluntary consent can validate what might otherwise be an illegal search
and seizure," and that consequently the validity of the stop was irrel-

evant.'
In reversing the conviction, the court of appeals first found the initial
stop of the truck to be invalid." 2 The court reasoned that the sole impetus
for the stop was the information given by the anonymous tip, and this
"did not meet the threshold requirements for an investigatory stop ... .
99. Id.
i00. id.
101. Il N.M. 448, 806 P.2d 588 (Ct. App.), cert. denied III N.M. 416, 806 P.2d 65 (1991).

102. Id.at 449, 806 P.2d at 589.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108.
109.
110.
Ill.

Id.at 449-50, 806 P.2d
Id. at 449, 806 P.2d at
Id. at 450, 806 P.2d at
Id.The state arrived at

at 589-90.
589.
590.
this "rule" by quoting dicta from State v. Cohen, 103 N.M. 558,

v. Hadley, 108
563, 711 P.2d 3, 8 (1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1158 (1986), and by citing State
Bedolla, III
literally.
dicta
the
follow
to
appears
which
1989),
App.
(Ct.
188
N.M. 255, 771 P.2d

N.M. at 453, 806 P.2d at 593.
112. Bedolla, II1 N.M. at 450, 806 P.2d at 590.
113. Id. at 451, 806 P.2d at 591. The court distinguished the stop in this case from situations
in which investigative detentions are properly made, such as ifdone to protect officers and others,
that
ifdone on the basis of more articulable facts, or ifdone pursuant to eyewitness information
accurately predicts future behavior. Id. at 450-53, 806 P.2d at 590-93.
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The court then held a voluntary consent alone does not always purge
the taint of prior police illegalities.1 4 Contrary holdings in State v.
Hadley" 5 and State v. Zelinske" 6 were expressly overruled."17 The court
interpreted the supreme court's decision in State v. Cohen" 8 to require
the consideration of "whether a voluntary consent to search obtained
after an illegal stop is an exploitation of the prior illegality and whether
the prior illegality affects the voluntariness of consent.""19 The court held
that the rule upon which the state relied allowed only for the possibility,
rather than the rigid necessity, of a voluntary consent removing the taint
of an illegal detention.'2 o
The court then specifically held that because the illegal act of stopping
the truck in this case was not sufficiently removed from the consent,
and that because the truck was stopped solely to investigate the anonymous
tip, even an assumedly voluntary consent would not purge the taint of
the illegal act.' 2' The court concluded, therefore, that Bedolla's motion
to suppress the drug evidence should have been granted. 22 As the illegal
act was an exploitation of the prior illegality, the issue of voluntariness
of consent was not reached. 2
Bedolla's importance lies in the court of appeals' interpretation of the
dicta in State v. Cohen that "a voluntary consent can validate what
might otherwise be an illegal search and seizure."'s' Rather than agreeing
with the state's contention that a voluntary consent must act as a cureall for police improprieties, the court read the Cohen dicta to mean that
a voluntary consent that is sufficiently attenuated from illegal police
activities may validate a subsequent search and seizure.
4. Protective Sweep
The United States Supreme Court recently added "protective sweep"
to the list of exceptions to the search warrant requirement.1' 5 The Court
held that:
[t]he Fourth Amendment permits a properly limited protective sweep
in conjunction with an in-home arrest when the searching officer
possesses a reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts

114. Id. at 455, 806 P.2d at 595.
115. 108 N.M. 255, 771 P.2d 188 (Ct. App. 1989).
116. 108 N.M. 784, 779 P.2d 791 (Ct. App. 1989).
117. Bedolla, 111 N.M. at 455, 806 P.2d at 595.
118. 103 N.M. 558, 563, 711 P.2d 3, 8 (1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1158 (1986). Dicta from
Cohen was relied upon by the state in its argument that a voluntary consent necessarily purges
the
taint of a prior illegality. Bedolla, III N.M. at 453, 806 P.2d at 593.
119. Bedolla, Ill N.M. at 455, 806 P.2d at 595 (emphasis in original).
120. Id. at 453, 806 P.2d at 593.
121. Id. at 456, 806 P.2d at 596.
122. Id.
123. Id. The court did note, however, that with regard to this issue the state has "a much heavier
burden to satisfy than when proving consent to search after a legitimate stop." Id.
124. Cohen, 103 N.M. at 563, 711 P.2d at 8.
125. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990).
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that the area to be swept 26harbors an individual posing a danger to
those on the arrest scene.'
The Court found justification for protective sweeps in "the threat posed
or more properly by unseen third parties in the
by the arrestee, ...
house."127
In State v. Lara, 28 the New Mexico Court of Appeals had occasion
argument took
to acknowledge this newest search warrant exception. An
129
The argument
friends.
three
and
Lara
between
home
place at Lara's
altercations
after
cut
somehow
were
friends
the
of
two
turned violent,
up with
met
three
The
house.130
the
fled
friends
three
all
and
Lara,
with
to
proceeded
then
who
officers,
police
nearby
to
story
their
told
and
a
conducted
and
arrest
under
Lara
placed
officers
The
house.'
Lara's
3 2 Lara appealed his conviction for
premises.
the
of
sweep
protective
aggravated battery, contesting, in part, the legality of the protective
sweep. 33 The court of appeals held that the protective sweep was valid
officers did
because of the violent nature of the crime and because 1 the
4
house.
the
in
people
not know if there were any other
5. Roadblock
The detention of motor vehicles and the questioning of drivers pursuant
to a police or border patrol roadblock constitutes a fourth amendment
seizure. 35 In New Mexico, however, a roadblock may be constitutionally
36 To be reasonable, New Mexico courts
permissible if it is reasonable.
require that a roadblock have adequate preparatory supervision, that
motorists be treated uniformly, that the roadblock be safe, that the
location be reasonable, that the official nature of the roadblock be
be
immediately apparent, that the length and nature of the roadblock
publicity. 37
advance
receive
roadblock
the
that
and
minimized,
In State v. Bolton, 3s Bolton and Gill were stopped at a roadblock
where police were checking for licenses, registrations, and proofs of

126. Id. at 337.
127. Id. at 336 (citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969)).
128. 110 N.M. 507, 797 P.2d 296 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 110 N.M. 330, 795 P.2d 1022 (1990).
129. Id. at 510, 797 P.2d at 299.
130. Id. at 510-11, 797 P.2d at 299-300.
131. Id.at 511, 797 P.2d at 300.
132. Id.; see also State v. Valdez, IlI N.M. 438, 806 P.2d 578; (Ct. App. 1990), cert denied,
fall
111 N.M. 316, 805 P.2d 85 (1991). In Valdez, the court of appeals held that a search did not
within the protective sweep exception because it occurred before the defendant was placed under
580.
arrest, and was thus not conducted "incident to a lawful arrest." Id. at 440, 806 P.2d at
133. Lara, 110 N.M. at 510, 797 P.2d at 299.
134. Id. at 514, 797 P.2d at 303.
135. Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (police sobriety checkpoint);
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556 (1976) (border patrol checkpoint).
136. City of Las Cruces v. Betancourt, 105 N.M. 655, 735 P.2d 1161 (Ct. App. 1987) (sobriety
roadblock); State v. Valencia Olaya, 105 N.M. 690, 736 P.2d 495 (Ct. App.) (roadblock to check
license, title, and insurance documents), cert. denied, 105 N.M. 689, 736 P.2d 494 (1987).
137. Betancourt, 105 N.M. at 658-59, 735 P.2d at 1164-65.
138. 111 N.M. 28, 801 P.2d 98 (Ct. App.); cert. denied, 111 N.M. 16, 801 P.2d 86 (1990).
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insurance. 3 9 At the time of "primary" inspection, to which almost all
noncommercial vehicles were subject, Gill gave statements about the
truck's ownership that were inconsistent with its registration.140 This
prompted a more thorough "secondary" inspection on the side of the
road.' 4' Police Officer Newman then obtained consent to search the truck,
and soon thereafter discovered that the gas tank contained cocaine. 42
Border Patrol personnel participated in the roadblock, and one of those
agents assisted in the search. 43
Bolton and Gill appealed their convictions for drug trafficking, arguing
in part that the roadblock was not valid because it was pretextual.' 44 In
affirming the convictions, the court of appeals held that the trial court
properly rejected Bolton and Gill's argument that the stated purpose of
the roadblock was a pretext. 45 Specifically, the defendants contended that
the roadblock's actual purpose was to check for drugs and illegal aliens
and not to check driving documents.' 46 The court found that the involvement of Border Patrol agents in the roadblock was probative, but
not determinative, of "whether the sole, or even the chief, purpose of
setting up the roadblock was an illegitimate one." " 41 The court then
concluded that the district court was entitled to believe police testimony
as to their motives for conducting the roadblock, and that sufficient
evidence was presented to reject Bolton and Gill's pretext theory.' 4 8
The Bolton decision could be important in the future because the court
recognized pretext as a potential abuse of the power to conduct roadblocks,
noting that the guidelines for determining the legitimacy of a roadblock
"include the reasonableness of the time, place, and duration of the
roadblock, which bear on the effectiveness of the roadblock to serve its
proper purpose."'' 49 The court also assumed that there are but a limited
number of reasons for the establishment of roadblocks. 50
The validity of a roadblock detention was also at issue in State v.
Goss."' Donal and Johnny Goss were stopped by a police roadblock
checking for driver's licenses, vehicle registrations, and proofs of insurance. 5 2 Johnny supplied the inspecting police officer, Officer Frisk,
with a license and registration.' Frisk then noticed a smell of marijuana

139. Id. at 31, 801 P.2d at 101.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 33, 801 P.2d at 103.
145. Id. at 37, 801 P.2d at 107.
146. Id. at 33, 801 P.2d at 103.
147. Id. at 36, 801 P.2d at 106.
148. Id. at 37, 801 P.2d at 107.
149. Id. at 34, 801 P.2d at 104.
150. Id. The court cited the checking of vehicle and document registration and sobriety as legitimate
uses of roadblocks.
151. 111 N.M. 530, 807 P.2d 228 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, III N.M. 416, 806 P.2d 65 (1991).
152. Id. at 531, 807 P.2d at 229.
153. Id.
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coming from, and observed a raised wooden platform in, the camper
shell of the Gosses' truck."14 Frisk testified that he secondarily detained
the Gosses, at which time he obtained oral permission to look under
the platform.' Frisk further testified that the marijuana smell 5became
6
intense and that he found several packages under the platform.' Frisk
placed the Gosses under arrest and subsequently obtained consent to
search the truck.'"1 Both men were convicted of unlawful distribution
of marijuana.' 58
The Gosses appealed those convictions, arguing that the secondary
detention and subsequent search of their truck was invalid because they
were detained even after they had produced the driving documentation
15 9 They also argued that evidence at
that was the aim of the roadblock.
6°
trial contradicted the plausibility of Officer Frisk's testimony.1 The court
6' The court held that Officer Frisk's
of appeals affirmed the convictions.'
smelling of marijuana coming from the truck constituted probable cause
62 The court further held that, even though
for the secondary detention.
the trial court was
the evidence could have been interpreted differently,
6
1
testimony.
Frisk's
entitled to credit Officer
Secondary detention at a roadblock was again at issue in State v.
Estrada. 64 Estrada and a passenger were asked about their citizenship
65
status at a Border Patrol checkpoint. Both produced valid immigration
documentation and neither exhibited suspicious behavior.'6 The quesplace,67
tioning agent noticed that the spare tire on the car was out of area.
detention
secondary
a
to
vehicle
the
and as a consequence directed
A search of the car was conducted pursuant to this detention and drugs
were discovered in the drive shaft.'" Estrada was convicted of possession
of drugs with intent to distribute.1'9
On appeal, the court of appeals considered whether the agent was
required to have a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing for the secondary
case. 70
detention and, if so, whether there was reasonable suspicion in this
The court concluded that while reasonable suspicion is not needed "to
divert motorists to secondary [areas] for the initial brief questioning and

154. Id. at 531, 807 P.2d at 229.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 532, 807 P.2d at 230.
159. Id. at 533, 807 P.2d at 231.
160. Id. at 534, 807 P.2d at 232.
161. Id. at 530, 807 P.2d at 228.
162. Id. at 534, 807 P.2d at 232.
163. Id.
164. 111 N.M. 798, 810 P.2d 817 (Ct. App. 1991).
165. Id.at 798, 810 P.2d at 817.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 799, 810 P.2d at 818.
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reasonable suspicion is required in secondary detentions

that involve more than routine questioning and inspection. 72 The court
then held that the abnormality of Estrada's spare tire by. itself did not
amount to reasonable suspicion for the secondary detention in this case. 71
Consequently, the court reversed Estrada's conviction. 74
The survey period's roadblock cases affirmed more convictions than
they reversed. Nevertheless, these cases appear to restrain the expansion
of roadblock searches and seizures. In its decisions, the New Mexico
Court of Appeals recognized pretext as a possible abuse of the roadblock
power of the police; 75 it implied that the legitimate uses of roadblocks
are limited; 76 and it held that an automotive abnormality that was not
in and of itself illegal did not create the reasonable suspicion needed for
77
a secondary detention.

6. Automobile Stops
Police may make an investigatory stop of a vehicle if they have a
reasonable belief that such a detention is appropriate. 71 Police may also
search a detained vehicle if there is probable cause to do so.

79

In State

v. Apodaca,' " Officer Conticelli stopped Apodaca for a safety belt
violation after observing his shoulder harness dangling from the ceiling.' 8'
After receiving suspicious and conflicting information about Apodaca's
car, Officer Conticelli asked for, and was given, permission to search
the trunk. 8 2 The officer smelled marijuana coming from a suitcase, and

a search of the suitcase confirmed his suspicions. 83
Apodaca was convicted of possession with intent to distribute marijuana. 84 Apodaca appealed his conviction, arguing that the reasonable
suspicion did not exist for the initial stop, that the stop was pretextual,
that the stop was unduly prolonged, and that the search of the suitcase
was unjustified. 85
In upholding the conviction, the court of appeals concluded that a
dangling shoulder harness constituted reasonable suspicion for a seat-belt
stop, and that sufficient evidence was presented to allow the trial court
to determine that the stop was not pretextual. 86 The court also held
171. Id. at 800, 810 P.2d 817 (citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976)).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 802, 810 P.2d at 821.

174. Id.
175. State v. Bolton, 111 N.M. 28, 34, 801 P.2d 98, 104 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 111 N.M. 16,
801 P.2d 86 (1990).
176. Id.
177. State v. Estrada, 111 N.M. 798, 802, 810 P.2d 817, 821 (Ct. App. 1991).

178. State v. Barton, 92 N.M. 118, 120, 584 P.2d 165, 167 (Ct. App. 1978).
179. Id.; see also, Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970).

180. 112 N.M. 302, 814 P.2d 1030 (Ct. App.), cert. denied 112 N.M. 220, 813 P.2d 1018 (1991).

181.
182.
183.
184.

Id.at 303, 814 P.2d at 1031.
Id.at 304-05, 814 P.2d at 1032-33.
Id. at 303, 814 P.2d at 1031.
Id.

185. Id. at 303-05, 814 P.2d at 1031-33.
186. Id.
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that, regardless of the officer's subjective suspicions about Apodaca, the
inconsistent statements and suspicious behavior of87Apodaca created an
objective justification for the post-stop detention.
In addressing whether the warrantless suitcase search was valid, the
court held that probable cause was first needed to search the entire
8 9
vehicle.' 8 The court then followed the decision in United States v. Ross,
in which the United States Supreme Court held that probable cause to
search a vehicle justifies the search of all of the contents of the vehicle
9
that might conceal the object sought.1 0 The court also overruled State
9' and State v. Walker'92 to the extent that they conflict with
v. White'
Ross. 93 The court finally concluded that Apodaca's consent to search
the trunk and the officer's subsequent detection of drugs in one container
and, therefore, that
constituted probable cause to search the whole car, 94
justified.1
was
suitcase
the
of
search
warrantless
the
In State v. Creech, 95 conservation officer Hanson stopped a truck in
his patrolling area after observing a man in the bed of the truck pointing
96 Officer Hanson then questioned the
a rifle toward oncoming traffic.
97
occupants of the car, including Creech.1 After reporting the incident to
9
the district attorney, it was discovered that Creech was a convicted99 felon.
Creech was prosecuted as a felon in possession of a firearm.' Creech
attempted to suppress the information he gave to officer Hanson, arguing
that Hanson had neither reasonable suspicion nor statutory authority to
the stop out of
make the stop. 200 Officer Hanson testified that he made
2
concern for public safety and to gather hunting data. ' The information
22
was introduced into evidence, Creech was convicted and he appealed.
In reversing the conviction, the court of appeals held that, although
hunting
officer Hanson testified that he stopped all vehicles to collect
2°3 The court
data, there existed no reasonable suspicion for these stops.

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id. at 304-05, 814 P.2d at 1032-33.
Id. at 305, 814 P.2d at 1033.
456 U.S. 798 (1982).
Id. at 825.
94 N.M. 687, 615 P.2d 1004 (Ct. App. 1980) (warrant required for search of boxes and

bags in car), overruled by, State v. Apodaca, 112 N.M. 302, 814 P.2d 1030 (Ct. App. 1991).
192. 93 N.M. 769, 605 P.2d 1168 (Ct. App. 1980) (warrant required for search of suitcase in
car), overruled by, State v. Apodaca, 112 N.M. 302, 814 P.2d 1030 (Ct. App. 1991).
193. Apodaca, 112 N.M. at 305-06, 814 P.2d at 1033-34.
194. Id.
195. 111 N.M. 490, 860 P.2d 1080 (Ct. App. 1991).
196. Id.at 491, 806 P.2d at 1081.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.

203. Id. at 494, 806 P.2d at 1084. The court noted that "[in some cases, statutory authority
provides a constitutionally adequate substitute [to reasonable suspicion]." Id. The court also noted
that "there was no evidence of department practice or regulation authorizing this customary practice,"
a consideration that had just recently been held to be a valid substitute for probable cause in State
v. Boswell, 111 N.M. 240, 804 P.2d 1059 (1991) (pertinent to inventory searches). Creech, 111 N.M.
at 494, 806 P.2d at 1084.
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also held that an emergency situation did not exist to justify the stop
because there was no evidence that other vehicles were on the road or
that officer Hanson believed the passenger in the bed of the truck would
intentionally or accidentally fire the rifle.2
7. Conclusion
The great majority of the survey period's warrantless search cases
resulted in the affirmance of convictions. One possible reason for this
outcome may be that the New Mexico appellate courts, either consciously
or unconsciously, are adhering to the currently popular judicial philosophy
of showing little sympathy for criminal defenses based on fourth amendment exclusion of evidence arguments. This philosophy has been aggressively promoted by the United States Supreme Court, which during
the Burger and Rehnquist tenures "has generally been inhospitable toward
both substantive fourth amendment claims and toward the exclusionary
rule as a way to enforce those claims.' ' 2 Chief Justice Rehnquist explained
the reasoning behind the philosophy when he stated that:
the so-called "exclusionary rule" created by this Court imposes a
burden out of all proportion to the Fourth Amendment values which
it seeks to advance by seriously impeding the efforts of the national,
state, and local governments to apprehend and convict those who
have violated their laws.m
This is not to say that the New Mexico appellate courts will mechanically
follow in every instance the Supreme Court's erosion of fourth amendment
defenses for criminal defendants.w However, in the current "tough on
crime" atmosphere, appellate court judges, who are retained or rejected
at general election, 2 8 may be somewhat hesitant to reverse the convictions
of blatantly guilty defendants on fourth amendment technicalities.
C.

Miranda Warnings
The fifth amendment of the United States Constitution provides that
no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself." 20
' The New Mexico Constitution also safeguards against

204. Creech, 11l N.M. at 495, 806 P.2d at 1085.
205. Wasserstrom, The Court's Turn Toward a General Reasonableness Interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment, 27 AM. Ciau. L. REv. 119, 148 (1989).
206. Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 437 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (1981).
207. For example, see State v. Cordova, 109 N.M. 211, 784 P.2d 30 (1989), in which the New
Mexico Supreme Court rejected the United States Supreme Court's test for the sufficiency of a
search warrant affidavit in favor of a more stringent standard. For a more detailed discussion of
Cordova, see Survey, Criminal Procedure, 21 N.M. L. REv. 623 (1991).
208. N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 33(A) states that:
Each justice of the supreme court, judge of the court of appeals, district judge or
metropolitan court judge shall ... be subject to retention or rejection on a nonpartisan ballot.
209. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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210 In Miranda v. Arizona2t ' the
self-incrimination in criminal contexts.
United States Supreme Court held that statements made by a person
during custodial interrogation may not be used to prosecute that person
"unless [the prosecution] demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards
22
effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. 1 These procedural safeguards are now commonly referred to as a person's "Miranda
period saw New Mexico appellate courts deal with
rights. ' 213 The survey
214
cases.
two Miranda
In State v. Trangucci,2" the New Mexico Court of Appeals considered
fell under the
whether Trangucci's statements made in police custody
2t ' Police, suspecting
warnings.
Miranda
"public safety" exception to the
Trangucci of aggravated assault and battery217with a firearm, entered
Trangucci's motel room with sidearms drawn. The police found Tranwere pulling him up officer
gucci hiding under a desk, and as they
218 Trangucci replied that he had
gun?"
the
Overman asked, "Where's
°
gotten rid of it.219 The police then read Trangucci his Miranda rights.M
Trangucci was convicted and he appealed, contending that the trial
court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statements about the
gun.?' Specifically, Trangucci argued that the public safety exception to
Miranda applied only to the safety of the general public and not to the
safety of the police alone.m In rejecting this argument and affirming
the conviction, the court stated that "[tihe Supreme Court has clearly
included considerations of police safety within the purview of the public
safety exception."2 3 Consequently, the court held that the evidence supported the trial court's decision to deny Trangucci's motion to suppress,
and the conviction was affirmed.?
In State v. Ybarra,225 an altercation occurred in which Garcia injured
Ybarra and in which Ybarra stabbed Garcia with a knife.?' The police
testify against
210. N.M. CONST. art. II, § 15 provides that "[n]o person shall be compelled to
himself in a criminal proceeding ..
211. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
212. Id. at 444.
that statements
213. These rights include the right to remain silent, the right to be informed
voluntarily
made may be used against the declarant, the right to an attorney, and the right to waive
Id.
rights.
the above
N.M. 631,
214. State v. Trangucci, 110 N.M. 385, 796 P.2d 606 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 109
788 P.2d 931 (1990); State v. Ybarra, 111 N.M. 234, 804 P.2d 1053 (1990).
P.2d 931 (1990).
215. 110 N.M. 385, 796 P.2d 606 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 109 N.M. 631, 788
York v. Quarles,
New
in
created
was
exception
safety
public
The
608.
at
P.2d
796
387,
at
Id.
216.
467 U.S. 649 (1984).
217. Id. at 386, 796 P.2d at 607.
218. Id. at 386-87, 796 P.2d at 607-08.
219. Id. at 387, 796 P.2d at 608.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 385, 796 P.2d at 606.
222. Id. at 387, 796 P.2d at 608.
at language in
223. Id. at 388, 796 P.2d at 609. In reaching this conclusion, the court looked
to secure their
necessary
questions
"between
distinguish
can
officers
that
stating
opinion
the Quarles
Quarles,
(quoting
608-09
at
P.2d
796
387-88,
at
Id.
"
....
public
the
own safety or the safety of
467 U.S. at 658-59).
224. Id. at 388, 796 P.2d at 609.
225. 111 N.M. 234, 804 P.2d 1053 (1990).
226. Id.
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placed Ybarra under arrest at the police station and then took him to
a hospital for treatment of his injuries.7 Officers had not yet read Ybarra
his Miranda rights. 22 During treatment, and in the presence of Officer
Wright, Nurse Price asked Ybarra questions about the altercation, to
which Ybarra gave several incriminating answers. 9
At trial, Ybarra moved to suppress Nurse Price's statements about
their conversation on the grounds that it was a custodial interrogation
in violation of Miranda protections. 230 The state argued that because the
police did not participate in the conversation, because the conversation
was the product of Nurse Price's initiative, and because Nurse Price was
not an agent of the police, no custodial interrogation took place and a
need for a Miranda warning was thus obviated. 231 The motion was
denied, 232 Ybarra was convicted of first degree murder, and he appealed. 233
The supreme court reversed the conviction.234 The court first discussed
at length the definition of "custodial interrogation.235 The court then
held that the conversation constituted a custodial interrogation because
"[a]lthough the police did not create [the compulsion inherent in custodial
surroundings], they took advantage of it by subjecting Ybarra to circumstances which they knew or should have known were reasonably likely
to elicit incriminating responses.'236
Thus, the survey period saw a restriction of the Miranda safeguard
with respect to its applicability before an officer's safety is assured.
Conversely, the survey period saw an expansion of the protection the
Miranda doctrine affords an arrestee in a situation in which there is no
public danger.
III.

DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND SENTENCE ENHANCEMENT

The guarantee against double jeopardy is found in the fifth amendment
of the United States Constitution, which declares that no person shall
"be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb. "237 Three protections flow from the double jeopardy guarantee of
the fifth amendment: 1) protection against a second prosecution of the
same offense after acquittal; 2) protection against a second prosecution

227. Id.

at 235, 804 P.2d at 1054.

228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. The trial court held that a custodial interrogation had taken place, but that a Miranda
warning was not needed because it fell under the "rescue doctrine." On appeal, however, the state
conceded that the rescue doctrine was inapplicable and continued to argue that there was no custodial
interrogation. Id.
233. Id. at 234, 804 P.2d at 1053.
234. Id. at 238, 806 P.2d at 1057.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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and 3) protection against multiple punishments for the
after conviction;
23

same offense.

The New Mexico Constitution also provides protection against double
jeopardy. 239 Additionally, two New Mexico statutes expand and define
the double jeopardy rights guaranteed to its citizens.? In New Mexico,
jeopardy attaches when the jury is empaneled in a criminal jury trial,
and in a bench trial when the state presents some evidence.2' Jeopardy
2
attaching, however, does not always guarantee that retrial is barred.
The most common double jeopardy issue the courts consider is whether
a defendant has been twice put in jeopardy for the same offense, where3
v. Abram,'24
one or more than one statute may be involved. In Owens
Court
Supreme
States
United
New Mexico adopted the test devised by the
2" for analyzing the "same offense"
in Blockburger v. United States
doctrine, in which the application of more than one statute could result
in a violation of any of the three double jeopardy protections provided
by the constitution. The test consists of comparing the statutory elements
of the offenses to determine whether it is possible to violate one offense
without violating the other?25 Where it is possible to violate one offense
without violating the other, double jeopardy protection for the "same
offense" would not apply.? Thus, where violation of one offense is not
possible without the other, the New Mexico Supreme Court has "merged"
a conviction and sentence for a crime that was a lesser included offense

238. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969) (citations omitted).
239. N.M. CONST. art. II, § 15.
240. New Mexico Statutes Annotated section 30-1-10 states:
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same crime. The defense of double
jeopardy may not be waived and may be raised by the accused at any stage of a
criminal prosecution, either before or after judgment. When the indictment, information or complaint charges different crimes or different degrees for the same
crime and a new trial is granted the accused, he may not be tried for a crime or
degree of the crime greater than the one of which he was originally convicted.
New Mexico Statutes Annotated section 30-31-27 (Repl. Pamp. 1989) states:
If a violation of the Controlled Substances Act is a violation of a federal law, the
law of another state or the ordinance of a municipality, a conviction or acquittal
under federal law, the law of another state or the ordinance of a municipality for
the same act is a bar to prosecution.
241. State v. Eden, 108 N.M. 737, 743, 779 P.2d 114, 120 (Ct. App. 1989) (citing State v. James,
93 N.M. 605, 603 P.2d 715 (1979)).
a mistrial.
242. For example, retrial is barred unless a "manifest necessity" exists in declaring
38, 41,
N.M.
108
Saavedra,
v.
State
(1824);
580
578,
Wheat.)
(9
U.S.
22
Perez,
United States v.
court finds the
766 P.2d 298, 301 (1988). In New Mexico retrial is also permitted if an appellate
177, 783
trial court based its conviction on erroneously admitted evidence, State v. Post, 109 N.M.
erroneously
P.2d 487 (Ct. App. 1989), or an appellate court finds the trial court based its dismissal on
109 N.M.
excluded evidence as opposed to insufficient evidence. County of Los Alamos v. Tapia,
736, 790 P.2d 1017 (1990).
overruled by, State
243. 58 N.M. 682, 274 P.2d 630 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 917 (1955),
v. Tijerina, 86 N.M. 31, 519 P.2d 127 (1973).
244. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
245. Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990).
jeopardy is
246. Id. at 510. This Court also stated that if under a Blockburger analysis, double
that constitutes
not barred, additional scrutiny must be given. If the prosecution must prove conduct
clause bars
an offense for which the defendant has already been prosecuted, the double jeopardy
519-21.
at
Id.
subsequent prosecution.
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of a greater charge. 247 More recently, however, in State v. McGuire,248
the New Mexico Supreme Court may have shifted its emphasis from
"same offense" to "same conduct." 249
New Mexico has treated the "same offense" doctrine by applying the
prohibition of multiple punishments to single acts as opposed to single
offenses. 2 0 New Mexico also looks to the number of victims to define
the number of separate offenses. 251 Finally, New Mexico uses public policy
concerns to define legislative intent. 25 2
The following section examines cases that raised double jeopardy claims

during the current survey period .253
A.

Adjudicated Innocence
In spite of constitutional and statutory protection, retrial is not barred
in all circumstances. As stated previously, double jeopardy does not bar
retrial when a "manifest necessity" to declare a mistrial exists. 2 4 Also,
double jeopardy does not bar retrial when the trial court bases a defendant's conviction on evidence that was erroneously admitted. 255
In State v. Archuleta2 6 the state appealed the lower court's dismissal
with prejudice of indictments against the defendants. The defendants were
charged with embezzlement or larceny over $250.00257 and conspiracy 2 8
to commit either embezzlement or larceny. 2 9 The state called Mr. Gulley
to testify regarding the retail value of the items at issue. 260 Defense counsel
objected to Gulley's testimony because he was present in an out-of-court
interview with a state witness who had testified previously. 26' The district
court found that defendants were prejudiced under Rule of Evidence 11615, which excludes all witnesses from the trial proceedings so they cannot
hear the testimony of other witnesses. 262 The state subsequently attempted

247. State v. Pierce, 110 N.M. 76, 86-87, 792 P.2d 408, 418-19 (1990).
248. 110 N.M. 304, 795 P.2d 996 (1990).

249. For a more in-depth discussion of the McGuire analysis, see Survey, Criminal Procedure,
21 N.M.L. REv. 623, 670-73 (1991).

250. State v. Pierce, 110 N.M. 76, 792 P.2d 408 (1990).
251. State v. Moore, 109 N.M. 119, 782 P.2d 91 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 109 N.M. 54, 781
P.2d 782 (1989).

252. State v. Martinez, 109 N.M. 34, 781 P.2d 306 (Ct. App. 1989). This court analogized three
counts of assisting escape to a previous case where public policy precluded four counts of drug
trafficking from merging into one count. Id. at 39, 781 P.2d at 311.
253. See Swafford v. State, 112 N.M. 3, 810 P.2d 1223 (1991); Herron v. State, 111 N.M. 357,
805 P.2d 624 (1991); State v. Mares, 112 N.M. 193, 812 P.2d 1341 (Ct. App. 1991); State v.
Archuleta, 112 N.M. 55, 811 P.2d 88 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Bachicha, Ill N.M. 601, 808 P.2d
51 (Ct. App. 1991).

254. See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
255. See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
256. 112 N.M. 55, 811 P.2d 88 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 112 N.M. 21, 810 P.2d 1241 (1991).

257. See N.M. STAT. ANN. 1978 § 30-16-8 (Cum. Supp. 1992) (embezzlement); N.M. STAT. ANN.
1978 § 30-16-1 (Cum. Supp. 1992) (larceny); N.M. STAT. ANN. 1978 § 30-1-13 (Repl. Pamp. 1984)
(accessory).
258. See N.M. STAT. ANN. 1978 § 30-28-2 (Repl. Pamp. 1984) (conspiracy).
259. Archuleta, 112 N.M. at 56, 811 P.2d at 89.
260. Id. at 57, 811 P.2d at 90.
261.

Id.

262. Id.
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to establish retail value through the introduction of price tags shown in
a photograph. 263 The court dismissed all counts of the indictment due
to insufficiency of evidence.2
The state argued that the district court abused its discretion in making
this determination. 265 The New Mexico Court of Appeals concluded,
26
however, that the state did not have a right of appeal in this case.
As a basis for applying a double jeopardy analysis, the court of appeals
said that because the district court began to hear evidence, the defendant
had already been placed in jeopardy once.6 7 Although New Mexico courts
have held that attachment does not guarantee a bar to retrial, the core
meaning of the double jeopardy clause is that a judgment of acquittal
may not be appealed. 2"
In this instance, the district court's dismissal amounted to a determination of the defendants' innocence, i.e., an acquittal. The court held
that "[a] judgment of acquittal, whether. based on a jury verdict of not
guilty or on a ruling by the court that the evidence isinsufficient to
convict, may not be appealed and terminates the prosecution when a
second trial would be necessitated by a reversal.' ' The court concluded
that any dismissal, whether appropriate or not, which "amounts to a
determination of a defendant's innocence" is equivalent to adjudicated
innocence and bars the state from appealing. 270
27'
The court analogized an erroneous dismissal to an erroneous acquittal.
Applying the analogy to this case, the court followed prior case law
pertaining to erroneous acquittals, therefore broadening the scope of
double jeopardy protection. 27 2 This ruling regarding adjudicated innocence
as a bar to retrial, however, narrows an exception to double jeopardy
protection, where an appellate court finds the trial court has erroneously
27"
excluded evidence as opposed to finding insufficient evidence.
Finally, the court found that because the district court's dismissal "was
not strictly necessary," the result is comparable to "a declaration of a
mistrial for reasons other than manifest necessity, and defendants cannot
be made to submit to another trial. ' 27 4 Although it seems that this
additional justification for barring retrial is superfluous, it appears that
a dismissal that is not "strictly necessary" may constitute "adjudicated

263. Id. These photos were later excluded from evidence, because they had not been. disclosed
to defendant. Id.
264. Id. at 57-58, 811 P.2d at 90-91.
265. Id. at 59, 811 P.2d at 91.
266. Id.
267. Id. (citing United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569 (1977)).
268. Id.
269. Id. at 58, 811 P.2d at 90 (quoting United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 91 (1978)) (emphasis
added).
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
274. Archuleta, 112 N.M. at 59, 811 P.2d at 92.
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innocence" analogous to an acquittal. This result would bar retrial under
New Mexico's previously established double jeopardy protection.
B.

Multiple Convictions/Punishments in the Same Trial
One situation in which a court must determine whether a defendant
has been put in jeopardy twice for the same offense is when he or she
is subject to multiple convictions or is given multiple punishments in the
same trial. In this situation, the double jeopardy guarantee may prevent
the court from "prescribing greater punishment than the legislature in-

tended.'"275
In New Mexico, if the legislature has not explicitly expressed a desire
for multiple punishments in a single prosecution, the Blockburger test 27 6
requiring statutory analysis has been applied to determine whether more
than one offense exists for purposes of multiple punishments.2 77 This
statutory analysis should also determine whether or not the greater offense
includes all the elements of the lesser offense.278 However, where there
is clear legislative intent for multiple punishments, merger of two offenses

may be precluded.27 9 New Mexico has shifted its emphasis from same
offense to same act,m and multiple victims may result in multiple offenses.ul

In State v. Bachicha, 28 2 the defendant argued that the trial court erred
by not merging each of his convictions of aggravated assault upon three
victims with his convictions of false imprisonment with a firearm. The
defendant claimed it was a single transaction. 2 3 As the result of a domestic
dispute, the defendant held a gun on his wife, his brother-in-law, and
his sister-in-law. 2" When the defendant's wife attempted to escape, he
caught her and forced her to the floor. 28- The defendant also shot his
sister-in-law.2"
The New Mexico Court of Appeals held that, under the facts of this
case, "the jury could properly convict defendant of the offense of false
imprisonment upon his wife, sister-in-law, and brother-in-law, and the
separate offenses of aggravated assault with a firearm upon the same
victims, because there was separate evidence of multiple aggravated as-

275. Grady v. Corbin. 495 U.S. 508, 517 (1990).
276. See supra notes 243-44 and accompanying text.
277. Owens v. Abrams, 58 N.M. 682, 274 P.2d 630 (1954), cert. denied, 348
278. State v. Pierce, 110 N.M. 76, 87, 792 P.2d 408, 419 (1990).
279. State v. McGuire, 110 N.M. 304, 309, 795 P.2d 996, 1001 (1990) (holding
evidence" was present independently to convict the defendant of two charges
requisite intents).
280. State v. Pierce, 110 N.M. 76, 85-86, 792 P.2d 408, 417-18 (1990).
281. State v. Moore, 109 N.M. 119, 127-28, 782 P.2d 91, 99-100 (Ct. App.),
N.M. 54, 781 P.2d 782 (1989).
282. 111 N.M. 601, 808 P.2d 51 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, IIl N.M. 529, 807
283. Id. at 603, 808 P.2d at 53.
284. Id. at 602, 808 P.2d at 52.
285. Id.
286. Id.

U.S. 917 (1955).
that "substantial
having different
cert. denied, 109
P.2d 227 (1991).
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saults upon each victim." 287 The court referred to 28specific acts of directing
8
and redirecting the rifle at each of the victims.
Furthermore, the court stated that "[m]erger does not occur when
different evidence is required to prove the two offenses.''2" A finding
of aggravated assault requires proof that a person having criminal intent,
threatened or engaged in menacing conduct with a deadly weapon toward
a victim, causing the victim to believe he or she was about to be in
29
danger of receiving an immediate battery. 0 False imprisonment requires
proof that a person restrained or confined the victim against his or her
will, where the person knew he had no authority to restrain or confine
the victim. 29' In this instance, the defendant's acts of assault constituted
292 However,
in part the method used to restrain and confine the victim.
merger of the two offenses was precluded because there was evidence of
separate, multiple acts of aggravated assault committed independently
293
from those of false imprisonment and against multiple victims.
The New Mexico Court of Appeals applied a fact-based analysis to
the preclusion of merger. Additionally, an indirect application of the
Blockburger test 294 was evident by the inclusion of the statutory elements
of both offenses. The court failed, however, to consider legislative intent
with respect to these two offenses. Concern regarding the court's application of a fact-based analysis that ignored the prior reasoning of the
New Mexico Supreme Court is expressed in Judge Hartz's concurring
opinion.295 Both the fact-based analysis and the legislative intent analysis
of Blockburger, however, would achieve the same result in this instance.
Herron v. State296 involved a defendant's appeal of a conviction for
nineteen of twenty-one counts of second degree criminal sexual penetration. The victim rode with three men to one of the defendant's homes
where two of the men sexually assaulted her.2
The court of appeals upheld the conviction.2 The supreme court granted
review to determine whether the convictions are contrary to the double
299
jeopardy clauses of the New Mexico and United States Constitutions.
The supreme court affirmed five of the nineteen convictions and sentences

287. Id.
288. Id. at 604, 808 P.2d at 54.
289. Id. at 603, 808 P.2d at 53 (citing State v. Muise, 103 N.M. 382, 707 P.2d 1192 (Ct. App.

1985)).

290. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-3-2 (Repl. Pamp. 1984); Sells v. State. 98 N.M. 786, 653 P.2d 162
(1982); State v. Manus, 93 N.M. 95, 597 P.2d 280 (1979); State v. Cruz, 86 N.M. 455, 525 P.2d
382 (Ct. App. 1974).
291. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-4-3 (Repl. Pamp. 1984); State v. Clark, 80 N.M. 340, 455 P.2d 844

(1969).
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.

Bachicha, 111 N.M. at 604.05, 808 P.2d at 54-55.
Id.
See supra notes 243-44 and accompanying text.
Id. at .606, 808 P.2d at 56 (Hartz, J., concurring).
111 N.M. 357, 805 P.2d 624 (1991).
Id. at 38, 805 P.2d at 325.
Id.
Id.
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for criminal sexual penetration." The case was remanded to the trial
court to vacate fourteen convictions and sentences and to resentence
accordingly.3°
The court reasoned that without a clear statutory command that each
re-penetration constituted a distinct offense, the court could not say that
the New Mexico Legislature intended multiple punishments. 3 2 The court
held that "separate penetrations can occur within sufficient temporal
proximity to raise doubt whether the legislature intended separate punishments for those acts which could equally be inspired by a single
criminal intent bent on a single assaultive episode.''303 3Where
there is
doubt the court indicated reliance on the rule of lenity. 4
The instant case follows the line of reasoning previously described in
State v. Pierce.305 In Pierce the supreme court merged fourteen separate
counts of child abuse into two, because it found that the legislature did
not intend for a defendant to be subject to multiple punishments for a
single act of child abuse.3°6 The court held that multiple convictions are
allowed where there is evidence showing that an abusive act is interrupted
and then another act is commenced;1 7 and also that each act must be
accompanied by the requisite unlawful conduct.10 As in Pierce, the state
in Herron did not establish that each act was distinct from the others.
Herron is distinguishable from Pierce, however, because the notion of
completeness regarding the act of sexual penetration is not pertinent to
acts of child abuse1 °9 The supreme court concluded that the notion of
completion served to distinguish between an attempt and a completed
crime, not between two completed crimes. Therefore, this court goes
beyond Pierce to clarify and eliminate potential confusion in determining
legislative intent.
Finally, in State v. Marest the defendant sought merger of kidnapping
and criminal sexual penetration counts and also merger of four counts
of battery. In this case, the victim met the defendant in a bar."' They
left the bar together in order to obtain some marijuana. 3 2 After giving

another couple a ride home, the defendant and victim stopped at a park
300. Herron, 111 N.M. at 363, 805 P.2d at 330.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 360-61, 805 P.2d at 327-28; see also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-11 (Repl. Pamp. 1984).
303. Herron, 111 N.M. at 360, 805 P.2d at 327.
304. Id. at 361, 805 P.2d at 328 (citing Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83-84 (1955)). "The
Court explained the rule 'means that if Congress does not fix the punishment for a federal offense
clearly and without ambiguity, doubt will be resolved against turning a single transaction into
multiple offenses."'
305. 110 N.M. 76, 792 P.2d 408 (1990).
306. Id.
307. Id. at 85, 792 P.2d at 417-18.
308. Id.
309. See People v. Harrison, 48 Cal. 3d 321, 329, 768 P.2d 1078, 1082, 256 Cal. Rptr. 401, 405
(citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 289 (West 1988)) ("a violation of section 289 is 'complete' the instant
'slight' 'penetration' of the proscribed nature occurs").
310. 112 N.M. 193, 812 P.2d 1341 (Ct. App. 1991).
311. Id.at 195, 812 P.2d at 1343.
312. Id.
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to use the restrooms.31 3 Subsequently, the defendant made "advances"
towards the victim. 31 4 The victim attempted to repel the defendant's efforts,
but the defendant became angry and began to choke the victim. 3" 3A
16
struggle ensued in which the defendant hit the victim with his fists.
When the victim attempted to escape, the defendant caught her and
choked and hit her. 3l7 The defendant also attempted to rape her.31832He
31 9 Subsequently, the victim escaped. 0
penetrated the victim vaginally.
The defendant sought merger of the kidnapping and criminal sexual
penetration counts and also merger of the four counts of battery. 32'
Applying a fact-based analysis, the court of appeals upheld the separate
convictions of kidnapping and criminal sexual penetration, because the
facts necessary to prove both crimes are different. 3" The court also
remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to vacate all but
and sentences, and to resentence the
one of the battery convictions
3
defendant on one count only. 2
The Mares court's analysis reflected its decision in Herron v. State.32
In Herron, the court held that the criminal sexual penetration statute
did not separately punish each penetration during a continuous attack,
unless proof of distinctive acts regarding each penetration existed.32 5 The
court in Mares applied the Herron analysis to multiple counts of batteries,
but found the record inadequate to establish distinctive acts for purposes
of multiple offenses. 32 In these three cases, it appears that both the New
Mexico Court of Appeals and the New Mexico Supreme Court have
shifted to a fact-based analysis combined with an indirect statutory
construction analysis to determine legislative intent regarding multiple
punishment.
In a highly-publicized case, Swafford v. State, 27 the supreme court
found no double jeopardy bar to separate convictions and punishments
for incest and criminal sexual penetration and assault with intent to
commit rape and criminal sexual penetration. 3I The victim was the defendant's half-sister. 32 9 While visiting the defendant and his family, both

313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
111
Id.

at 196, 812 P.2d at 1344.

at 198, 812 P.2d at 1346.
at 201-2, 812 P.2d at 1349-50.
N.M. 357, 805 P.2d 624 (1991).
Various factors which help determine whether acts are distinct include the time between

acts, the location of the victim at the time of each act, the existence of and intervening event,
distinctions in the commission of the' acts, the defendant's intent, and the number of victims. Id.
at 359, 805 P.2d at 626.
326. Mares, 112 N.M. at 199, 812 P.2d at 1347.
327. 112 N.M. 3, 810 P.2d 1223 (1991).
328. Id. at 11-12, 810 P.2d at 1231-32.
329. Id. at 6, 810 P.2d at 1226.
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the victim and the defendant spent the evening at home drinking.3 0 The
victim went to bed and was awakened by the defendant, who was pulling
a rope he had tied around her wrist. 3 ' The defendant responded violently
to the victim's attempts to repel his attack. 3 2 The defendant tied the
victim's arms and legs to the bed.313 The defendant was charged With
criminal sexual penetration with a candle and his penis.3 34 He was sentenced
to terms of four years each for third degree sexual penetration, incest,
and aggravated assault plus two years for false imprisonment. 33 The
defendant claimed a violation of double jeopardy protection against
multiple punishments for the same offense because the acts arose out of
the same act of sexual intercourse and each
offense necessarily includes
336
the other and must merge for sentencing.
The supreme court clearly distinguished between those cases in which
the defendant has been charged with multiple violations of a single statute
based on a single course of conduct, and cases in which the defendant
is charged with violations of multiple statutes. 3 7 In both cases, whether
legislative intent exists to authorize multiple punishments is the relevant

inquiry .338
After reviewing and classifying the various tests previously applied in
New Mexico, 339 the Swafford court adopted a two-part test to determine
legislative intent to punish.34 The first part of the test inquires whether
or not the conduct underlying the offense violates both statutes.3 4' If the
conduct is determined to violate both statutes, then the second part of
the test applies. 342 If the conduct is separate and distinct, however, then
the inquiry ends. 343 This part of the test necessarily involves a close
examination of the facts.
The second prong of the test focuses on the statutes to determine
344
whether the legislature intended to create separately punishable offenses.
"Absent a clear expression of legislative intent, a court first must apply
the Blockburger test to the elements of each statute. 3 4 A finding that

330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 7, 810 P.2d at 1227.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Id. at 11-12, 810 P.2d at 1231-32. The previously applied tests in New Mexico have included:
1) the "same evidence test"; 2) the "necessarily involved" test; and 3) the "necessarily included"
test. Id. All three of these tests are variations involving an examination of statutory elements. A
fourth test, first set forth in State v. DeMary, 99 N.M. 177, 655 P.2d 1021 (1982), allows the
accused to a "lesser offense" instruction based on the evidence obtained at trial and the elements
of the lesser offense. Swafford, 112 N.M. at 12, 810 P.2d at 1232.
340. Swafford, 112 N.M. at 13, 810 P.2d at 1233.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Id. For a discussion of the Blockburger test, see supra notes 243-44 and accompanying text.
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the elements of the statutes are not subsumed within the other is not
conclusive, but it creates a presumption that the statutes punish distinct
offenses.1 6 This presumption may be overcome by other traditional means
of determining legislative intent, including an identification of social evils
and the quantum of punishment available for
sought to be3 4addressed
7
each offense.
In this case, the court found no double jeopardy bar to both convictions
and consecutive sentences for incest and criminal sexual penetration.3
In applying the first part of the test, the court found that the conduct
underlying both offenses violated both statutes.3 9 Additionally, upon
applying the second part of the analysis, there was a strong indication
of legislative intent to punish each offense separately." 0 The statutes
indicate separate elements and also achieve different policy objectives. 3"'
The court also held that separate convictions and punishments for assault
with intent to commit rape and criminal sexual penetration are appropriate
in this case."12 Applying a fact-based analysis, the court found evidence
of distinctive rather than unitary acts. According to that finding, the
the test to conclude
court did not need to apply the second prong 3of
3
that the convictions and sentences were proper.
Thus, Swafford provides New Mexico with an expanded test that is
inclusive of previously applied tests pertaining to multiple punishments
under the same offense doctrine. This test incorporates a fact-based
analysis, a statutory construction analysis, and traditional legislative intent
analyses through a simple two-step process. Additionally, it allows for
consideration of social policy to influence the determination of whether
or not multiple conviction or punishment is proper.
C. Sentence Enhancement
Sentence enhancement also falls within the fifth amendment protection
provided by the double jeopardy clause against multiple punishments for
the same offense." New Mexico asserts the same double jeopardy guarantee as the federal Constitution under its own state constitution.3 55
Additionally, two pertinent New Mexico statutes provide objective standards and guidelines for enhancing basic sentences due to aggravating
circumstances.35 6 Other relevant statutes include the Criminal Sentencing

346. Id.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. See id. at 14, 810 P.2d at 1234.
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
355. N.M. CoNsT. art. II, § 15.
356. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-15.1 Alteration of basic sentence; mitigating or aggravating circumstances; procedure; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-5 Aggravating circumstances.
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Act, which incorporates the habitual-offender statute.35 7 Under that statute35
enhancement depends on the number of the defendant's prior felony
convictions.2 9
New Mexico has asserted this same constitutional protection in holding
that a state's attempt to enhance an individual's sentence under a habitual
offender statute after initial sentencing may constitute a double jeopardy
violation. 360 Sentence enhancement may also violate double jeopardy stan36
dards if it is not "within objectively reasonable expectations of finality." 1
Accordingly, a sentence may not be enhanced after the sentence has been
served.
New Mexico has also held that sentence enhancement is impermissible
when the same facts used to convict a defendant are also used to enhance
the defendant's sentence under the habitual offender statute. 362 The double
jeopardy clause also prohibits double use of the same felony. 63 The
following section examines seven cases that raised double jeopardy claims
3
pertaining to sentence enhancement during the current survey period. 6
Six of these cases involve this second type of sentence enhancement.
1. Enhancement and Prior Convictions
In State v. Castrillo, 365 the New Mexico Court of Appeals held that
the enhancement provisions of Castrillo's sentence were invalid. Castrillo
had acknowledged that he was a felon and that he had been in possession
of a firearm. 36 Castrillo was convicted of being a felon in possession
3 68
of a firearm. 367 His sentence was enhanced as a habitual offender.
Castrillo contended that the use of the same prior felony to prove both
the crime of felon in possession of a firearm and his status as a habitual
offender violated the prohibition of double jeopardy.3 69 The state conceded
that the sentence was improper. 370 The court concluded, therefore, that

357. N.M. STAT. ANN. 1978, § 31-18-13(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1987) states: "all persons convicted of
a crime under the laws of New Mexico shall be sentenced in accordance with the provisions of the
Criminal Sentencing Act . . . ." Id.
358. Id. § 31-18-17.
359. State v. Peppers, 110 N.M. 393, 400, 796 P.2d 614, 621 (1990).
360. March v. State, 109 N.M. 110, 782 P.2d 82 (1989).
361. Id.
362. Peppers, 110 N.M. at 400, 796 P.2d at 621.
363. State v. Haddenham, 110 N.M. 149, 793 P.2d 279, cert. denied, 110 N.M. 72, 792 P.2d
48 (1990).
364. State v. Castrillo, 112 N.M. 766, 819 P.2d 1324 (1991); State v. Calvillo, 112 N.M. 140,
811 P.2d 794 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Watchman, Ill N.M. 727, 809 P.2d 641 (Ct. App. 1991);
Swafford v. State, 112 N.M. 3, 810 P.2d 1223 (1991); State v. Reneau, Ill N.M. 217, 804 P.2d
408 (Ct. App. 1990); State v. Smith, 110 N.M. 534, 797 P.2d 984 (Ct. App. 1990); State v. Peppers,
110 N.M. 393, 796 P.2d 614 (Ct. App. 1990).
365. 112 N.M. 766, 819 P.2d 132 (1991).
366. Id. at 769, 819 P.2d 1327.
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Id. at 767, 819 P.2d 1325.
370. Id.

Summer 1992]

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE

sentence was invalid. 7' The
the enhancement provision of the defendant's
72
case was remanded for resentencing.1
In Swafford v. State,3 73 the defendant contended that enhancement
cannot be based on an element-in this case the victim's blood relationship
to defendant-that was required to convict the defendant of incest in
the same trial.3 74 The court agreed, because use of the same statutory
element for conviction and enhancement is "repetitive of the punishment
for the crime ' 3 75 and in violation of a
the legislature has established
376
statute.
New Mexico
Two other cases from this survey period upheld the defendant's
convictions and enhanced sentences. The defendant's convictions were
affirmed in State v. Peppers.377 On October 24, 1988, Peppers pleaded
no contest to a charge of failure to appear for sentencing on a conviction
of vehicular homicide. 37 The next day the state filed supplemental criminal
information and alleged that Peppers was a habitual offender.3 79 On
October 26, 1988, Peppers admitted to being an habitual offender . 3 On
November 1, the court filed the judgment and sentence, plus an enhanced
sentence of eight years under the habitual offender statute. 38 , Subsequently,
Peppers filed a motion to withdraw his plea. 8 2 One of the issues Peppers
conviction could be
raised on appeal was whether the vehicular-homicide
33
sentence.
failure-to-appear
his
used to enhance
The court of appeals found that the two acts of vehicular homicide
and failure to appear constituted two separate acts, contrary to defendant's
suggestion otherwise. 384 The court stated that the two acts are not contemporaneous and "the state did not have to prove vehicular homicide
as an element of the failure to appear. ' 3 5 The court further reasoned
that although previous New Mexico law38 6 derives from an assumption
about legislative intent, such as if a previous felony is considered to
determine the punishment, the legislature does not intend that the same
previous felony can also be used to establish that defendant was a habitual
offender.38 7 In its reasoning the court distinguished this case from previous

371. Id.
372. Id.; see also State v. Reneau, 111 N.M. 217, 804 P.2d 408 (Ct. App. 1990) (holding it
impermissible to sentence defendant as habitual offender when same facts were relied on to convict
him of felon in possession of-a firearm).
373. 112 N.M. 3, 810 P.2d 1223 (1991).
374. Id. at 16, 810 P.2d 1236.
375. Id.
376. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-15.1 (Repl. Pamp. 1990).
377. 110 N.M. 393, 394, 796 P.2d 614, 615 (Ct. App. 1990).
378. Id. at 703
379. Id. at 394-95, 796 P.2d 615-16.
380. Id. at 394, 796 P.2d 615.
381. Id.
382. Id.
383. Id. at 394, 796 P.2d 615.
384. Id.
385. Id. at 400, 796 P.2d 621.
386. State v. Haddenham, 110 N.M. 149, 763 P.2d 279 (Ct. App. 1990); State v. Keith, 102
N.M. 462, 697 P.2d 145 (Ct. App. 1985).
387. Peppers, 110 N.M. at 400-01, 796 P.2d at 621-22.
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New Mexico cases. 8 Here, "the same facts are not used both to prove
the offense and to enhance the punishment. "3 Conviction of the offense
being tried is necessary for purposes of the habitual offender statute,
but not to prove failure-to-appear. 90
Similarly, in State v. Calvillo3 9 the court of appeals regarded Calvillo's
prior convictions as separate. On October 27, 1986, Calvillo was convicted
of burglary and battery on a peace officer. 39 The crimes were disposed
of at the same time even though they were committed on different dates.3 93
On December 5, 1990, Calvillo was convicted of the crime of felon in
possession of a firearm. 31 At the trial, the parties stipulated to Calvillo's
previous burglary conviction.3 9 Following the felon in possession of a
firearm conviction, the state filed supplemental information. 39 The trial
court dismissed the information based on its interpretation of State v.
Haddenham.39 The state appealed the trial court's decision. 39
In this case the New Mexico Court of Appeals found no "double use"
problems analogous to Haddendam, because here the question was whether
the judgment may be "split" such that one conviction may be used to
enhance under the habitual offender statute, while the other may be used
to prove the underlying felony for the felon in possession charge. 39
Although both the habitual offender and felon in possession of a firearm
statutes have the common purpose of deterrence for the commission of
subsequent crimes, the felon in possession of a firearm statute serves an
additional purpose.4w This statute also protects society by prohibiting the
possession of firearms by felons. 401 Given this additional policy consideration, the court saw no problem with splitting the convictions to serve
separate purposes. 0
One final case regarding an enhanced sentence, State v. Watchman,4 3
involved aggravating a defendant's felony conviction. The conviction was
based upon his prior uncounseled "driving while intoxicated" ("DWI")
convictions obtained in the Navajo Tribal Court and in the Gallup
Municipal Court. On October 15, 1988, Watchman was involved in a

388. Id. at 401, 796 P.2d at 622.
389. Id.

390. Id.
391. 112 N.M. 140, 811 P.2d 794 (Ct. App. 1991).
392. Id. at 141, 811 P.2d 795.
393. Id.

394. Id.
395. Id.
396. Id.
397. Id. (citing State v. Haddenham, 110 N.M. 149, 793 P.2d 279 (Ct. App. 1990)). The court
held that a trial court could not sentence a defendant as a habitual offender when the same felony
was relied upon to convict him of being a felon in possession of a firearm. Id.

398.
399.
400.
401.
402.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 612.
Id.
Id.

403. I1

N.M. 727, 809 P.2d 641 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, Ill N.M. 529, 807 P.2d 227 (1991).

Summer 1992]

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE

head-on collision, which resulted in the death of two people.0 Watchman
pleaded guilty to two counts, of vehicular homicide. 405 The trial court
requested a presentence report.40 The report indicated prior convictions
in tribal court and the Gallup Municipal Court for DWI. 40 7 Watchman
moved to exclude this evidence, but the trial court denied the motion.0 8
The trial court found that Watchman's basic sentence should be enhanced
by an additional year because of aggravating circumstances.* 9
The New Mexico Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in
aggravating Watchman's felony conviction based upon his prior uncounseled DWI convictions. 410 The court explained that it is improper to
sentence a defendant as a second offender, enhancing the penalty imposed,
when the defendant's prior conviction was obtained without benefit of
4
counsel. 1
Regarding the use of prior convictions for purposes of sentence enhancement, it seems that the court has not diverted from its prior
reasoning. Simply stated, New Mexico courts are willing to allow sentence
enhancement only where no "double use" is evident.
2. Enhancement and Guilty Plea
In State v. Smith,412 the New Mexico Court of Appeals reversed the
defendant's sentence, including enhancement, and remanded for further
proceedings contingent upon the defendant's decision to withdraw his
guilty plea. Smith pleaded guilty to robbery. 4 3 At the sentencing hearing
Smith's sentence was enhanced pursuant to section 31-18-16.1(A)(2) of
the Criminal Sentencing Act, over his objection. 414 Smith claimed he was
entitled to notice of the state's intent to seek enhancement
and that,
415
upon remand, only the basic sentence should be entered.
The court reasoned that although there was no plea agreement between
Smith and the state, a sufficient remedy would allow Smith to be returned
to his earlier position, since there was no evidence of Smith's reliance
on his plea. 416 Furthermore, now that Smith had received notice, it would
be appropriate to remand for a sentencing hearing. 41 7 Finally, the court
stated that double jeopardy did not preclude a new trial on the en418
hancement issue.

404.
405.
406.
407.
408.
409.
410.
411.
412.
413.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
110
Id.

at 729, 809 P.2d at 643.
at 729-30, 809 P.2d at 643-44.
at 730, 809 P.2d at 644.
at 733, 809 P.2d at 647.
(following State v. Ulibarri, 96 N.M. 511, 632 P.2d 746 (Ct. App. 1981)).
N.M. 534, 797 P.2d 984 (Ct. Ap. 1990).
at 535, 797 P.2d 985.

414. Id.
415. Id.

416. Id. at 535-36, 797 P.2d at 985-86.
417. Id.
418. Id. at 536-37, 797 P.2d at 986-87 (citing State v. Linam, 93 N.M. 307, 600 P.2d 253, cert.

denied, 444 U.S. 846 (1979)).
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EVIDENCE

The New Mexico Supreme Court and the New Mexico Court of Appeals
have addressed several hearsay issues during the survey year. The courts
examined the constitutional right to confront a witness in the context of
admitting out-of-court statements, 4 9 evaluated the scope of the excited
utterance doctrine, 4 and addressed the admissibility of out-of-court statements that are recanted at trial.42' The courts also examined relevancy
issues surrounding the admissibility of prior convictions, 4" witness credibility, 423 and the admissibility of insurance in a criminal case. 424 Finally,
the courts examined the abuse of discretion doctrine,4 2 and sufficiency
of evidence questions. 426
A.

Hearsay Cases
1. Constitutional Right to Confront a Witness
The right to confront a witness arises from the sixth amendment of

the United States Constitution and a similar provision of the New Mexico
Constitution. 42 These provisions simply state that a defendant has a right
"to be confronted with the witnesses against him." 42 The United States
Supreme Court has construed this to mean, generally, that the right to
confront a witness is satisfied where the declarant of the statement is
subject to cross examination at any stage of the proceedings. 429 In Ohio
v. Roberts,43" the Supreme Court held that a two-step analysis must be
applied before a statement can be admitted without contravening a defendant's rights under the confrontation clause. 43' First, there must be

419. State v. Hoeffel, 112 N.M. 358, 815 P.2d 654 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 112 N.M. 279, 814
P.2d 457 (1991); State v. Sanchez, 112 N.M. 59, 811 P.2d 92 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Pacheco,
110 N.M. 599, 798 P.2d 200 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 110 N.M. 533, 797 P.2d 983 (1990).
420. State v. Mares, 112 N.M. 193, 812 P.2d 1341 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 112 N.M. 235, 814
P.2d 103 (1991).
421. State v. Vigil, 110 N.M. 254, 794 P.2d 728 (1990).
422. State v. Reneau, 11 N.M. 217, 804 P.2d 408 (Ct. App. 1990); State v. Duncan, 111 N.M.
354, 805 P.2d 621 (1991); State v. Baca, III N.M. 270, 804 P.2d 1089 (Ct. App. 1990), cert.
denied, III N.M. 164, 803 P.2d 253 (1991).
423. State v. Reynolds, 111 N.M. 263, 804 P.2d 1082 (Ct. App. 1990), cert. denied, Ill N.M.
164, 803 P.2d 253 (1991); State v, Finchum, Ill N.M. 716, 809 P.2d 630 (1991); State v. Flanagan,
Ill N.M. 93, 801 P.2d 675 (Ct. App. 1990), cert. denied, 111 N.M. 77, 801 P.2d 659 (1990).
424. Flanagan, IIl N.M. at 93, 801 P.2d at 675.
425. State v. Mathis, 111 N.M. 687, 808 P.2d 972 (Ct. App.), rev'd, 112 N.M. 744, 819 P.2d
1302 (1991); Montoya v. Super Save Warehouse Foods, Ill N.M. 212, 804 P.2d 403 (1991); Scoggins
v. State, 111 N.M. 122, 802 P.2d 631 (1990).
426. State v. Muniz, 110 N.M. 799, 800 P.2d 734 (Ct. App. 1990), cert. denied, 110 N.M. 749,
799 P.2d 1121 (1990); State v. Rubio, 110 N.M. 605, 798 P.2d 206 (Ct. App. 1990), cert. denied,
110 N.M. 641, 798 P.2d 591 (1990).
427. U.S. CONST. amend. Vi; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 14.
428. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; N.M. CONST. art. 11, § 14.
429. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970). (confrontation concerns satisfied by cross-examination of declarant at preliminary hearing).
430. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
431. Id.
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2
Second, there must
a showing that the declarant is unavailable at trial.44333
statement.
the
to
be sufficient indicia of reliability
The New Mexico Court of Appeals recently examined the meaning 4of
the "indicia of reliability" prong of the test. In State v. Pacheco, 14
defendants Pacheco and Baca picked up two women who were walking
home from a bar in Espanola. 43' The women were a mother and daughter.43 '
The four of them returned to the home of the two women.4 3 7 Pacheco
and Baca allegedly tied one woman in the living room and forced the
other woman to engage in sexual intercourse.4 31 The defendants then
forced her to leave with them and they drove to Ojo Caliente to take
Pacheco home.43 9 On the drive back, Baca allegedly forced intercourse
on the woman again before they returned to Espanola."'4
Pacheco was charged with false imprisonment and kidnapping." 1 Baca
was charged with false imprisonment, kidnapping, and criminal sexual
penetration." 2 Pacheco did not testify at the trial." 3 Baca testified that
the woman voluntarily accompanied him on the drive and voluntarily
engaged in intercourse.4" During the trial, the court admitted an out-ofcourt statement by Michael Campos.44 1 Campos was a friend of Baca
and had stated that Baca told him he had "partied" with the woman
on the night the alleged crimes took place." 6 The trial court admitted
this statement under "other" hearsay exceptions." 7
The court of appeals held that the statement was improperly admitted
because it lacked sufficient reliability to satisfy confrontation concerns."'
The court looked at whether this out-of-court statement was admissible
by applying a trustworthiness test." 9 The court held that the statement
by Campos was not admissible because it lacked "any circumstantial
guarantee of trustworthiness. ' '4 The court indicated there would not
have been a hearsay problem if Campos had testified at the trial. 451 The
court identified four dangers of hearsay evidence to be considered in
determining trustworthiness of a statement. 4 2 They are ambiguity, lack

432.
433.
434.
435.
436.
437.
438.
439.
440.
441.

Id. at 65.
Id. at 65-66.
110 N.M. 599, 789 P.2d 200 (Ct. App. 1990).
Id. at 600, 798 P.2d at 201.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

442. Id.
443. Id.
444.
445.
446.
447.
448.
449.
450.
451.
452.

Id. at 600-01, 798 P.2d at 201-02.
Id. at 601, 798 P.2d at 202.
Id.
See N.M. R. EvwD. 11-804(BX6).
Pacheco, 110 N.M. at 603, 798 P.2d at 204.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 601, 798 P.2d at 202.
Id. at 603, 798 P.2d at 204.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22

of candor, faulty memory, and misperception. 45 3 In applying these standards, the court found dangers of ambiguity, lack of candor, and faulty
memory, and thus found the statement inadmissible. 454 The importance
of this case is the ruling by the court that hearsay exceptions must be
narrowly construed in criminal cases because of confrontation concerns.
The court of appeals also examined the trustworthiness of an out-ofcourt statement by a co-defendant in a burglary case. In State v. Sanchez, 455 Sanchez was charged with burglary and conspiracy.4 56 The evidence
against Sanchez was based on a taped interview with co-defendant Chacon
that linked Sanchez to the crimes. 45 7 Chacon was declared unavailable as
a witness because he said he did not recall the taped interview due to
458
drug use.
The court of appeals held the admission of this statement was proper
because there was other corroborative evidence, and the trial court
properly found indicia of trustworthiness sufficient to overcome concerns
of the defendant being able to confront a witness. 45 9 Instead of applying
the "four dangers" test of Pacheco, the court looked to the totality
of the circumstances in determining the trustworthiness of the statement. 460 The court employed the same confrontation clause analysis used
by the United States Supreme Court in Idaho v. Wright.461 The ,court
examined whether there was other corroborative evidence, whether the
statement attempted to shift blame, whether the statement was against
the penal interest of the declarant, and whether the declarant was offered
leniency in exchange for the statement.4 2 Applying this totality of the
circumstances test, the court held that the statement was not made in
exchange for leniency, was not made to shift blame, and was against
the penal interest of the declarant." a Based on these factors and the
existence of other corroborative evidence, the court held that the statement was properly admitted."4 In this case, the statement was by a codefendant, which prompted the court to apply a slightly different trustworthiness test from the test applied in the earlier Pacheco ruling.
453. State v. Taylor, 103 N.M. 189, 197, 704 P.2d 443, 451 (Ct. App. 1985).
454. Pacheco, 110 N.M. at 603, 798 P.2d at 204.
455. 112 N.M. 59, 811 P.2d 92 (Ct. App. 1991).
456. Id. at 60, 811 P.2d at 94.
457. Id.
458. Id.
459. Id. at 65, 811 P.2d at 98. The court also noted that this statement could have been admitted
under the prior inconsistent statements exception to hearsay at N.M. R. EVID. 11-801(D)(1)(a).
460. Sanchez, 112 N.M. at 65, 811 P.2d at 98.
461. 497 U.S. 805 (1990). The confrontation clause analysis as set forth by the Supreme Court
in this case looked at the totality of the circumstances and declined to apply a mechanical test.
See State v. Earnest, 106 N.M. 411, 744 P.2d 539 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 924 (1987) (where
the New Mexico Supreme Court held that admission of a confession by a co-defendant did not
violate the confrontation clause because it had sufficient indicia of reliability because the co-defendant
was not offered leniency in exchange for the statement, the statement was against the declarant's
penal interest, the statement did not attempt to shift blame, and there was other evidence to
corroborate the statement).
462. Sanchez, 112 N.M. at 65, 815 P.2d at 98.
463. Id.
464. Id.
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In State v. Hoeffel,"8 Hoeffel claimed a violation of his right to
confront a witness when the court refused to allow the result in a prior
civil case, which discharged him from liability, to be introduced in a
criminal case of embezzlement. Hoeffel was charged with embezzling
furniture from his landlady.A Prior to the criminal proceeding, Hoeffel
had filed a civil claim against his landlady, claiming she had improperly
seized his personal belongings." 7 The landlady counterclaimed that Hoeffel
improperly removed furniture from his rental unit.4" The judge presiding
over the civil action issued an opinion letter stating he believed the
landlady's counterclaim of improper removal of furniture by Hoeffel was
without merit." 9 This opinion letter was what Hoeffel sought to introduce
in the subsequent criminal trial for embezzlement. 470 The trial court did
not allow the opinion letter into evidence. 47 ' Nonetheless, Hoeffel was
472
allowed to ask the landlady about it during cross examination. Hoeffel
argued his ability to confront the landlady as a witness was limited
court did not allow him to introduce the opinion letter into
because the
473
evidence.
The court of appeals stated that the New Mexico courts only allow
the introduction of prior judgments in two situations and that the opinion
letter failed to fall into either case. 474 The court of appeals held there
was no confrontation clause problem because Hoeffel was allowed 4to
7
cross-examine the landlady with respect to the existence of the civil suit. "
Thus, the court of appeals has indicated that it is unwilling to broaden
the exceptions for admissibility of prior proceedings. This case reiterates
that the court of appeals narrowly construes exceptions to hearsay rules
when confrontation concerns exist.
2. Statement Recanted at Trial
There are two basic reasons for the hearsay exception for prior inconsistent statements which effectually give such statements substantive
effect. 476 First, because it is proper for the jury to consider such statements

465. 112 N.M. 358, 815 P.2d 654 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 112 N.M. 279, 814 P.2d 457 (1991).
466. Id.at 359, 815 P.2d at 655.
467. Id.
468. Id.
469. Id.
470. Id.
471. Id.
472. Id.
473. Id.
474. See N.M. R. Evw. 11-803(V), (W). Provision "V" allows for admission of a judgment of
a previous felony conviction to prove any fact essential to sustain the judgment, not including
judgments against persons other than the accused when offered by the state in a criminal prosecution
for a purpose other than impeachment. Provision "W" allows for admission of a judgment as to
proof of matters of personal, family, or general history or boundaries when essential to the judgment
when such matters would be provable by evidence of reputation. Furthermore, although the court
treated the opinion letter as a prior judgment, it is unclear whether an opinion letter should be
considered a judgment within the meaning of the rules.
475. Hoeffel, 112 N.M. at 361, 811 P.2d at 657.
476. Maestas, 92 N.M. at 144, 584 P.2d at 191.
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for impeachment purposes, the jury may also consider the trustworthiness
of the prior statement versus the trustworthiness of the testimony at
trial. 477 Second, statements which are made closer in time to the event
may be more trustworthy than testimony at trial because a declarant has
not been influenced by outside pressures. 478
State v. Vigi" 79 was a trial for first degree murder. Vigil shot and
killed her husband, claiming the gun had gone off accidentally as the
result of a struggle. 4 0 The trial court found that the gun was intentionally
discharged."' The trial court admitted an out-of-court statement of a
witness who said the defendant had admitted to shooting her husband
12
because she was upset at having discovered he had molested her daughter.4
This statement was recanted by the witness and she refused to attribute
the statement to the defendant at the trial. 48 3 The trial court admitted
this statement that was recanted during the trial under the prior inconsistent statement exception to hearsay.4" Vigil was convicted of the first
485
degree murder of her husband.
She appealed the conviction, claiming, inter alia, that the trial court
erred in admitting a prior extrajudicial statement recanted by the declarant
at trial. 486 The court of appeals allowed the statement.4 7 The court of
appeals held the statement was clearly admissible under the prior inconsistent statement exception to hearsay, and although the trial court could
have refused to admit the statement because of prejudicial effect, it is
clearly within the discretion of the trial court to weigh the probative
value of a statement against prejudicial effect.488 The conviction was
affirmed. 48 9 This case reinforces that broad latitude is afforded to the
trial courts in considering whether to admit prior inconsistent statements.
B.

Relevancy
Relevant evidence is defined as "evidence having any tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of
the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence. ' ' 490 New Mexico courts have interpreted relevant evidence to be

477. Id.
478. Id.
479. 110 N.M. 254, 794 P.2d 728 (1990).
480. Id. at 256, 794 P.2d at 730.
481. Id.
482. Id. at 258, 794 P.2d at 732.
483. Vigil, 110 N.M. at 258, 794 P.2d at 732.
484. N.M. R. Evm. 11-801(D)(l)(a). This rule states that a statement is not hearsay if a declarant
testifies at trial, is subject to cross examination, and the statement offered is inconsistent with the
declarant's testimony. The court noted the statement would have been admissible as an admission
under N.M. R. Evm. 11-801(D)(2).
485. Vigil, 110 N.M. at 254, 794 P.2d at 728.
486. Id. at 258, 794 P.2d at 732.
487. Id.
488. See State v. Davis, 97 N.M. 130, 637 P.2d 561 (1981).
489. Vigil, 110 N.M. at 259, 794 P.2d at 733.
490. N.M. R. Evro. 11-401.
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evidence that tends to establish a material proposition, 49l is offered to
prove an issue and sheds light on that issue, 492 and naturally and logically
tends to establish a fact in issue.4 93
1. Prior Convictions: Character Evidence
Where character is an element of the crime, it is admissible under the
general provisions of the relevant evidence rule. 494 Generally, character
evidence is not admissible to prove conduct; 495 however, evidence of other
crimes, wrongs or acts is admissible for other purposes such as proof
plan, knowledge, identity,
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
4
4
or absence of mistake or accident. 9 This list, however, is not exclusive. 9
New Mexico courts have been cautious when ascertaining whether character is an element of a crime because of the potential impact on the
outcome of the criminal proceeding.
In State v. Reneau,49 Reneau was tried for voluntary manslaughter in
the shooting death of her husband. 4 9 There was a history of abuse to
50
Reneau by her husband. ° Reneau was staying at her mother's home.
Her husband went to the house and threatened Reneau and her mother
several times on the day he was shot.5 ° He had earlier slashed the tires
on her car and also threatened to cut her. 503 After this threat, Reneau
pointed a gun at her husband.5 ° He laughed, reminding her that the last
time she had pointed a gun at him he severely beat her with a lead
pipe.50 5 Reneau then shot her husband. 510 She was convicted. 507
The New Mexico Court of Appeals reversed the conviction and remanded the trial because evidence of Reneau's prior acts of violence
were improperly admitted1°s The court held that the character of the
defendant is not an element of self-defense so character evidence was
not admissible under the other crimes, wrongs, or acts exception to the

491. State v. Romero, 86 N.M. 99, 519 P.2d 1180 (Ct. App. 1974).
492. State v. Gutierrez, 79 N.M. 732, 449 P.2d 334 (Ct. App. 1968), cert. denied, 80 N.M. 33,
450 P.2d 633 (1969).
493. Wright v. Brem,'81 N.M. 410, 467 P.2d 736 (Ct. App. 1970).
494. N.M. R. Evro. 11-402; see State v. Smith, 92 N.M. 533, 591 P.2d 664 (1979); see also
Thorp v. Cash, 97 N.M. 383, 640 P.2d 489 (Ct. App. 1981) (where the court held that this rule
does not bar character evidence when character is an element of the crime).
495. N.M. R. EvtD. 11-404(A).
496. N.M. R. EVID. 11-404(B).
497. State v. Lara, 109 N.M. 294, 784 P.2d 1037 (Ct. App. 1989).
498. 111 N.M. 217, 804 P.2d 408 (Ct. App. 1990).
499. Id. at 218, 804 P.2d at 409.
500. Id.
501. Id.
502. Id.
503. Id.
504. Id.
505. Id.
506. Id.
507. Id.
508. Id. at 219, 804 P.2d at 410.
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character evidence rule.5°9 The court reasoned that the inquiry into selfdefense examines the reasonableness of defendant's fear of imminent
danger, which is a question for the jury. 10
This case clarifies the New Mexico law with regard to whether character
evidence is an element of self-defense. Because the court of appeals has
held that character evidence is not an essential element of self-defense,
evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts may not be introduced as
relevant in a self-defense inquiry. Such evidence may only be used to
rebut good character when the defendant puts her character in issue.5"
Similarly, in State v. Duncan, 12 the New Mexico Supreme Court discussed whether the character of the coercer is an element in the defense
of duress.5 13 Duncan had met the victim, Polly, and her husband through
a prison fellowship program while he was incarcerated at the Los Lunas
Correctional Facility. 1 4 Duncan stayed with them after he was released
from prison and maintained contact after he moved into his own place.515
Duncan had an acquaintance named Wiggington that he knew from
prison.51 6 Polly had let Duncan store some of Wiggington's personal
things at her house. 17 Wiggington went to retrieve his personal effects
after he ascertained that Polly's husband would be out of town."1
On the night of August 5th, about a week after Wiggington was
released, he met Duncan after work, pulled out a knife, and told him
he was going to kill Polly. 19 Wiggington told Duncan to telephone Polly.5 20
She picked them up at the supermarket and brought them to her home.5 2'
Duncan testified that he went along with it because he was afraid that
Wiggington would kill Polly otherwise.5 2 Once they arrived at Polly's
home, Wiggington pulled out his knife and told her he was going to
rape and rob her. 23 He proceeded to rape her then attempted to suffocate
her with a pillow. 5 24 Wiggington instructed Duncan to suffocate an exchange student staying with Polly who had been kept hostage during the
509. See N.M. R. EVID. 11-404(B). This rule states that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or
acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity
therewith. The case law interpreting this rule indicates that the rule does not bar character evidence
when character is an essential element of a crime. Thorp v. Cash, 97 N.M. 383, 640 P.2d 489 (Ct.
App. 1981).

510. Reneau, 111 N.M. at 219, 804 P.2d at 410.
511. N.M. R. Evl.

11-404(A)(1).

512. 111 N.M. 354, 805 P.2d 621 (1991).
513. Id. at 355, 805 P.2d at 622. The supreme court opinion refers to the court of appeals' case
for a statement of the facts and issues on appeal. The court of appeals' case is State v. Duncan,
30 N.M. BAR BULL. 258 (Ct. App. Apr. 4, 1991).
514. State v. Duncan, 30 N.M. BAR BULL. 258.

515. Id.at 259.
516. Id.
517.
518.
519.
520.
521.
522.
523.
524.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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night. 5 Duncan refused5 to do this and finally persuaded Wiggington to
leave the women alone. 2
At the trial, Duncan claimed the defense of duress because he was
afraid Wiggington would kill Polly if he did not cooperate. 27 The trial
court excluded evidence regrading the character of Wiggington. 521 Duncan
was convicted of aggravated burglary, kidnapping, false imprisonment,
armed robbery, 29 criminal sexual penetration, and unlawfully taking of a
motor vehicle .
The court of appeals remanded and held that the character of the
coercer is an element of the defense of duress.13° The question was certified
by the supreme court. 53' The supreme court held that the character of
the coercer is not an element of the defense of duress.5 32 The supreme
court agreed with the court of appeals that the evidence of character
had been improperly excluded. 33 The supreme court reasoned that the
character evidence should have been admitted because it went to Duncan's
state of mind and was therefore relevant."' In this case, the supreme
court dispelled a controversy regarding character evidence by definitively
holding that character of the coercer is not an element of the defense
of duress.
State v. Baca 35 involved the admissibility of prior acts. Baca and his
father, the co-defendant in this case, knocked on the door of the victims'
apartment in the early hours of the morning, claiming to be looking for
someone. 36 Baca and his father were both armed and they forced their
way into the apartment and stole money from the victims. 37 Baca was
aggravated burglary, and conspiracy to
convicted of armed robbery,
5 38
commit armed robbery.
On appeal, Baca argued that the trial court's admission of police
testimony regarding pursuit of him on an allegedly stolen motorcycle was
not admissible under the prior bad acts rule. 39 The court of appeals held
that an officer's testimony regarding the prior acts of a defendant was
admissible. 40 The court of appeals found the officer's testimony was
admissible because it was a police mistake and therefore the taint of a
prior bad act was not present in the testimony and could not have

525.
526.
527.
528.
529.
530.
531.
532.
533.
534.
535.
(1991).
536.
537.
538.
539.
540.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 260.
Id. at 258.
Id. at 263.
State v. Duncan, Ill N.M. 354, 355, 805 P.2d 621, 622 (1991).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 357, 805 P.2d at 624.
111 N.M. 270, 804 P.2d 1089 (Ct. App. 1990), cert. denied, III N.M. 164, 803 P.2d 253
Id. at 272, 804 P.2d at 1091.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 277, 804 P.2d at 1096. The prior bad acts rule is found at N.M. R. EviD. 11-404(B).
Id.
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prejudiced the defendant.5 4' The court rejected Baca's argument that
evidence of an uncharged crime is inadmissible.14 2 Baca relied on State
v. Beachum,m3 which held that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts
can only be admitted if it is relevant to an issue other than character
and its prejudicial effect is outweighed by its probative valueA4 The
court of appeals found the Beachum precedent to be "inapposite" because
it characterized the officer's testimony as regarding a "police mistake"
5 Thus, the court
rather than as regarding a prior bad actYm
of appeals
implicitly broadened the prior acts exception by allowing the uncharged
incident to be admitted, while at the same time expressly stating that
the incident was not a prior bad act.
2. Prior Convictions: Credibility of a Witness
Evidence of a prior conviction is admissible to impeach the credibility
of a witness.146 The conviction must have been for a crime punishable
by death or imprisonment in excess of one year or have involved dishonesty
or a false statement.m7 Evidence of crimes more than ten years old is
generally not admissible.5 4 The purpose of questioning a witness as to
prior convictions is to cast doubt on the credibility of a witness.549
The court of appeals examined the scope of the prior convictions rule
in State v. Reynolds.55° Reynolds was convicted of burglary. 55 ' Reynolds
claimed he was denied a fair trial for several reasons, one of which was
the prosecutor's attempt to inform the jury of felony convictions which
were over ten years old. 5 2 During cross examination, Reynolds referred
to his "habitual" status. " 3 The prosecutor asked what he meant and
Reynolds answered it meant he had been in trouble more than once."'
Reynolds was referring to convictions for crimes over ten years old. "
Generally, crimes over ten years old are not admissible to impeach the
credibility of a witness under the prior convictions rule.5 1 The defense
moved for a mistrial, which the trial court denied.5 7

541.
542.
543.
544.
545.
546.

Id.
Id.
96 N.M. 566, 632 P.2d
Id. at 567, 632 P.2d at
Baca, 111 N.M. at 277,
N.M. R. Evn. 11-609;

1204 (Ct. App. 1981).
1205.
804 P.2d at 1096.
see also State v. Mares, 112 N.M. 193, 812 P.2d 1341 (Ct. App.

1991).
547. N.M. R. EvuD. I1-609.

548. Id.
549. See State v. Coca, 80 N.M. 95, 451 P.2d 999 (Ct. App. 1969); Sierra Blanca Sales Co.,
Inc. v. Newco Indus., 84 N.M. 524, 505 P.2d 867 (Ct. App.), cert. denied 84 N.M. 512, 505 P.2d
855 (1972).
550. 111N.M. 263, 804 P.2d 1082 (Ct. App. 1990).
551. Id. at 264, 804 P.2d at 1083.
552. Id. at 267, 804 P.2d at 1086.
553. Id.
554. Id.
555. Id.
556. N.M.

R. EVID. 11-609(B).

557. Reynolds, I II N.M. at 267, 804 P.2d at 1086.
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The court of appeals ruled it was within the discretion of the trial
8
court to deny the motion for a mistrial." The court of appeals noted
that the defense failed to move for the prosecutor to be admonished,
9
which is one possible remedy."1 The court held there was no error because
the defendant mentioned the topic himself and therefore could not claim
prejudice.mO The court reasoned that defense counsel should have objected
earlier and not let the defendant answer the prosecutor's question about
the meaning of habitual.-' The court held that although evidence of
crimes more than ten years old is generally not admissible to impeach
the character of a witness, it is not error to admit such crimes if the
witness is responsible for bringing attention to the prior convictions, there
to correct the
is a lack of due diligence on the part of the attorney
6 2 Because Reynolds's
situation, and the trial court finds no prejudice.
attorney failed to object, the court of appeals allowed deviation from
the prior convictions rule which prohibits the use of convictions more
than ten years old to impeach the credibility of a witness.
6
In another case, State v. Finchum, 1 the New Mexico Supreme Court
held that it was not error to admit a statement to a doctor by a defendant
that he had killed someone.5" Finchum was accused of5 first degree murder,
tampering with evidence, and aggravated burglary." Finchum and the
over
victim were acquainted. 5 " Finchum and the victim had an argument
567 Finchum
him.
offered
whether Finchum should take the drugs the victim
allegedly said the victim treated him disrespectfully and he wanted to
get even. 5" After the body was discovered, Finchum allegedly told several
people he had killed the victim.5" At the trial, the prosecutor was allowed
to introduce a statement Finchum had made to his doctor that he had
his statement to the doctor was extrinsic
killed someone.570 Finchum argued
72
5 7' The trial court allowed the statement.
evidence and not admissible.
573
Finchum was convicted by a jury.
The supreme court affirmed the convictions and held Finchum's statement to the doctor admissible because it was not admitted for the truth

558. Id.at 268, 804 P.2d at 1087.

559. Id.
560. Id.at 267, 804 P.2d at 1086; see also State v. Garcia, 80 N.M. 466, 457 P.2d 985 (1969).
561. Reynolds. III N.M. at 267, 804 P.2d at 1086. The court reiterated the precept that the
P.2d
defense has a duty to object at the earliest time, citing State v. Fish, 102 N.M. 775, 782, 701
374, 381 (Ct. App. 1985).
562. Reynolds, 11I N.M. at 268, 804 P.2d at 1087.
563. I11 N.M. 716, 809 P.2d 630 (1991).
564. Id. at 719, 809 P.2d at 633.
565. Id. at 716, 809 P.2d at 630.
566. Id. at 717, 809 P.2d at 631.
567. Id.
568. Id.
569. Id.
570. Id.
571. Id.
572. Id.
573. Id.
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of the matter asserted, but went to the credibility of the witness. 74 The
court said this statement was admissible because it was used to impeach
Finchum's statement that he had never told anyone he had killed someone.5 7
The court did not expressly state as much, but implied that this statement
was allowable as a prior inconsistent statement to impeach the declarant. 17
3.

Relevancy of Insurance Coverage and Opinion Testimony
Revisited
Generally, evidence of insurance coverage is not admissible in an action
for negligence because it is immaterial and prejudicial. 7 It may be
admissible when it is highly relevant to an issue in the lawsuit.578 Evidence
of insurance may also be admissible for purposes other than proving
negligence, such as proof of ownership. 7 9 Trial courts have a great deal
of discretion in applying this rule and only an abuse of discretion with
prejudicial results can be held error.1 °
In State v. Flanagan,58' the trial court held it was not error to admit
evidence of insurance in a criminal case.582 Flanagan was charged with
vehicular homicide. 83 Flanagan was driving his vehicle when it accelerated
suddenly and hit a truck, causing the truck to roll.51 The driver of the
truck died.58 5 There was conflicting evidence regarding the speed at which
Flanagan's vehicle was traveling.SM He was convicted of homicide by

vehicle.587

Flanagan raised two issues regarding admissibility of evidence on appeal.
First, he argued unfair prejudice from the admission of insurance evidence. 5 88 The court of appeals reasoned that even though mention of
insurance coverage is usually prejudicial in a civil case, there was little
chance of prejudice from insurance evidence in a criminal case. 5 9 The
court indicated that even if the evidence was improper, the defense should
have asked for the jury to be admonished.5 90 Second, Flanagan argued

574. Id.
575. Id.
576. See N.M. R. EvW.
1 1-801(D)(1)(a).
577. Mac Tyres v. Vigil, 92 N.M. 446, 589 P.2d 1037 (1979); Cardoza v. Town of Silver City,
96 N.M. 130, 628 P.2d 1126 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 96 N.M. 116, 628 P.2d 686 (1981).
578. Mac Tyres, 92 N.M. at 448, 589 P.2d at 1039.
579. N.M. R. EviD. 11-411.
580. Mac Tyres, 92 N.M. at 448, 589 P.2d at 1039; see also Davila v. Bodelson, 103 N.M. 243.
704 P.2d 1119 (Ct. App. 1985).
581. Il N.M. 93, 801 P.2d 675 (Ct. App. 1990).
582. Id. at 98, 801 P.2d at 680.
583. Id. at 94, 801 P.2d at 676.
584. Id. at 95, 801 P.2d at 677.
585. Id.
586. Id.
587. Id. at 94, 801 P.2d at 676.
588. Id. at 95, 801 P.2d at 677.
589. Id. at 96, 801 P.2d at 678.
590. Id. at 95, 801 P.2d at 677. The court adopted the same standard for criminal cases as the
one used in civil cases, stating that prejudicial effects are cured by prompt admonishment. See
Chavez v. Chenoweth, 89 N.M. 423, 533 P.2d 703 (Ct. App. 1976).
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that testimony by a witness that a different witness may have been
incorrect was improperly admitted.5 9' The court of appeals discussed
of a
witness credibility and noted that the rule allows the credibility
92 While
opinion.
an
of
form
the
in
supported
or
attacked
be
witness to
the court said it was improper for a witness to testify that another witness
was "mistaken," it was permissible for the prosecutor to attempt to clear93
inconsistencies.
discrepancies in testimony by asking a witness to explain
Thus, the court of appeals disallowed testimony by a witness that another
witness was "mistaken," yet allowed the implication to be made.
C. Abuse of Discretion
Abuse of discretion is often claimed by parties on appeal; however,
claim
the standard to be applied is vague and an abuse of discretion
594
claim.
each
of
circumstances
particular
must be considered in light of the
The New Mexico Court of Appeals has articulated the abuse of discretion
standard to be "a ruling clearly against the logic and effect of the facts
595
and circumstances before the court."
The court of appeals addressed an abuse of discretion claim where a
trial court dismissed a case when the state failed to comply with discovery.
In State v. Mathis,596 the defendants were charged with trafficking conby an informant who
trolled substances based on information supplied
597 The state was ordered
had transacted the drug deals with defendants.
5 98 The state obto produce certain documents regarding the informant.
tained a writ of prohibition from the supreme court staying some of the
discovery orders.5 9 The trial court then ordered the state to show cause
why it had failed to comply with the discovery orders that were not
stayed.6w
At a hearing upon the defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to
comply with discovery, the trial court granted the motion because it
found undue delay and prejudice caused by the state's failure to6 2comply
with discovery. 6° 1 The state appealed the dismissal of the case. 0
The court of appeals, for the first time, addressed the issue of whether
or under what circumstances criminal charges may be dismissed for failure
°3
to comply with a discovery order.6 The court held that dismissal was

591. Flanagan, I11 N.M. at 95, 801 P.2d at 677.
of
592. Id. at 96-97, 801 P.2d at 679-80 (citing N.M. R. Evi). 11-608, which discusses evidence
character and conduct of witnesses).
593. Id. at 97, 801 P.2d at 679.
594. See generally State v. Hargrove, 81 N.M. 145, 464 P.2d 564 (Ct. App. 1970).
595. State v. Lucero, 98 N.M. 311, 314, 648 P.2d 350, 353 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 98 N.M.
336, 648 P.2d 794 (1982).
596. 111 N.M. 687, 808 P.2d 972 (Ct. App.), rev'd, 112 N.M. 744, 819 P.2d 1302 (1991).
597. Id. at 689, 808 P.2d at 974.
598. Id.
599. Id. at 690, 808 P. 2d at 975.

600. Id.
601. Id.
602. Id. at 691, 808 P.2d at 976.
603. Id. at 694, 808 P.2d at 979.
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too severe of a sanction.6 The court of appeals reasoned that the conduct
of the state was not to be considered unreasonable delay in light of the
writ of prohibition by the supreme court. 6°s The court also reasoned that
the state had complied with the discovery to the best of its ability.6
The court stated that dismissal of a case for failure to comply with
discovery is a severe sanction and that a trial court should impose the
least severe sanction available.67
The New Mexico Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari in this
case.608 The supreme court held that the court of appeals erroneously
determined that the state could further challenge the discovery orders
following the writ of prohibition. 09 The supreme court also found that
the trial court was within its discretion when it dismissed the case because
of the state's failure to comply with discovery. 6 0 The supreme court
discussed the "prosecutorial team" concept, which requires various agencies to cooperate in good faith with criminal prosecutions. 61 ' The supreme
court reasoned that allowing agencies to challenge discovery orders on
jurisdictional grounds would hinder the discovery purpose of bringing
612
forth the true facts.

613 was a non-criminal
Montoya v. Super Save Warehouse Foods
case
also dealing with an abuse of discretion claim. In Montoya the supreme
court upheld the jury verdict for Montoya and held it was neither an
abuse of discretion nor reversible error to allow an undisclosed witness
to testify. 614 The court distinguished this case from Khalsa v. Khalsa.615
In Khalsa, the court of appeals held it was error to allow an undisclosed
witness to testify because the witness was an expert and knowledge of
the expert testimony was crucial to prepare an effective cross-examina61 6

tion.

The instant case was distinguished by the Montoya court because

the undisclosed witness in Montoya was a rebuttal witness and testimony

by rebuttal witnesses was within the discretion of the trial court. 6 7
In Scoggins v. State,68 the supreme court found it was not an abuse

of discretion for the trial court to dismiss a case when the state lost its
evidence. Scoggins was charged with possession with intent to distribute

604. Id.
605. Id. at 693, 808 P.2d at 978.
606. Id.
607. Id. at 694, 808 P.2d at 979 (citing United States v. Euceda-Hernandez, 768 F.2d 1307 (11th
Cir. 1985)).
608. Mathis v. State, 112 N.M. 744, 819 P.2d 1302 (1991).
609. Id. at 746, 819 P.2d at 1304.
610. Id. at 747, 819 P.2d at 1305.
611. Id. at 746, 819 P.2d 1304 (citing State v. Wisniewski, 103 N.M. 430, 435, 780 P.2d 1031,
1036 (1985)).
612. Id. at 747, 819 P.2d at 1305.
613. 111 N.M. 212, 804 P.2d 403 (1991).
614. Id. at 215, 804 P.2d at 406.
615. 107 N.M. 31, 751 P.2d 715 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 107 N.M. 16, 751 P.2d 700 (1988).
616. Id. at 33-35, 751 P.2d at 716-18.
617. Montoya, I11 N.M. at 215, 804 P.2d at 406.
618. 111 N.M. 122, 802 P.2d 631 (1990).
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6 9 Evidence of
methamphetamine and possession of controlled substances.
drug paraphernalia, latent fingerprints of the defendant, and lab equip620
case was dismissed.
ment were lost by the police department and the
The state appealed to the court of appeals and the6 dismissal was
reversed. 62' Scoggins then appealed to the supreme court. 2 The supreme
court reversed the court of appeals and sustained the original decision
of the trial court. 623 The supreme court reversed the holding of the court
appropriate where there is
of appeals that dismissal of a case is only
6 24 The court of appeals held
state.
the
of
part
gross negligence on the
that the proper course of action would be suppression of the lost evidence
625 The
or admission with full disclosure of the loss and its relevance.
supreme court disagreed. It held that the exclusion of evidence is within
the materiality and
the discretion of the trial court after considering
62 This holding has the effect
evidence.
the
of
effect
possible prejudicial
of emphasizing the broad discretion given to trial courts in determining
evidentiary issues. This case may lead to further debate regarding the
appropriateness of a dismissal sanction where evidence is lost in a criminal

case.

Sufficiency of the Evidence
The standard for determining whether there is evidence sufficient to
support a verdict in New Mexico is whether substantial evidence of either
a direct or circumstantial nature exists to support a verdict of guilty
627 In
beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to every essential element.
of the
62
drug cases, proof of possession may be established by evidence
evidence.
circumstantial
with
along
conduct and actions of the defendant
Constructive possession exists when a defendant has knowledge and control
6
over the presence of drugs. " In the event that a defendant is not in
exclusive control of the premises, an inference of constructive possession

D.

619. Id.

620. Id.
621. Id. at 123, 802 P.2d at 632.
622. Id. at 122, 802 P.2d at 631.
623. Id.
P.2d 680 (Ct. App.
624. Id.The court of appeals relied on State v. Doe, 92 N.M. 354, 588
and mere negligence
negligence
gross
is
there
when
appropriate
only
is
dismissal
that
held
which
1978),
631.
at
P.2d
802
122,
at
N.M.
111
Scoggins,
dismissal.
compel
is not enough to
relied on State v.
625. Scoggins, Ill N.M. at 123, 802 P.2d at 632. The court of appeals had
standard set by
Chouinard, 96 N.M. 658, 634 P.2d 680 (1981), where New Mexico followed the
when there is bad
the second circuit that sanctions should only be imposed against the government
negligence.
faith and that sanctions are not appropriate when evidence is lost out of mere
96 N.M. 658, 662626. Scoggins, 111 N.M. at 124, 802 P.2d at 633 (citing State v. Chouinard,
holding. He asserted
63, 634 P.2d 680, 684-85 (1981)). Justice Baca dissented from the majority
and the defendant
that dismissal is only proper where there is bad faith on the part of the prosector
802 P.2d at 633-34
124-25,
at
Id.
trial.
to
proceed
parties
the
if
result
will
prejudice
that
asserts
(Baca, J., dissenting).
627. State v. Sutphin, 107 N.M. 126, 131, 753 P.2d 1314, 1319 (1988).
(Ct. App.
628. State v. Donaldson, 100 N.M. 111, 119, 666 P.2d 1258, 1226

629. State v. Montoya, 85 N.M. 126, 127, 509 P.2d 893, 894 (Ct. App. 1973).

1983).
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can only be drawn if there are other incriminating circumstances.63 0 There
were two important sufficiency of the evidence cases decided during this
survey period.
In State v. Muniz, 63' the court of appeals re-examined the issue of
constructive possession in light of the ruling in State v. Brietag.6 2 In
Muniz, the police obtained a search warrant for the residence where they
believed Muniz resided. 633 In the bedroom, they found marijuana along
with letters addressed to the defendant at the searched address.634 There
was no other evidence of any personal items belonging to Muniz. 611 Muniz
was convicted of possession of marijuana. 636
Muniz argued that Brietag required the state to account for all of the
contents of the bedroom in order to establish that a defendant is in
exclusive control. 637 The court of appeals limited the application of Brietag
by saying it indicated that silence concerning other contents of a room
where some of defendant's belongings are found along with drugs could
not defeat an inference of possession. 638 This decision indicates that
constructive possession may be found with very slight evidence of a
defendant's dominion and control.
In State v. Rubio,639 the court of appeals broadened the types of
circumstantial evidence that may be used to demonstrate drug possession,
adopting the practices of various jurisdictions. 6 " In this case, the police
obtained a wire tap on the telephone of Jerry Askew."' Police intercepted
conversations between Askew and Rubio. 64 2 There was no mention of
drugs in these conversations, however. Askew and Rubio arranged to
meet after each conversation.6 3 Officers observed Askew and Rubio
together but did not see drugs or money exchanged." Askew was arrested
and named Rubio as a drug customer in a plea agreement.6 5
Rubio was convicted for possession of cocaine based on Askew's
testimony and other circumstantial evidence. 6 " The evidence presented
630. State v. Herrera, 90 N.M. 306, 563 P.2d 100 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 90 N.M. 636, 567
P.2d 485 (1977); State v. Bowers, 87 N.M. 74, 529 P.2d 300 (Ct. App. 1974).'
631. 110 N.M. 799, 800 P.2d 734 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 110 N.M. 749, 799 P.2d 1121 (1990).
632. 108 N.M., 368, 772 P.2d 898 (Ct. App. 1989). In Brietag, the court of appeals held that
there was insufficient evidence to establish constructive possession where the defendant leased a
home but was absent from the premises and the personal belongings of several people were found
in the bedroom where drugs were found. Id. at 371, 772 P.2d at 901. The court found insufficient
evidence because there were no facts indicating the defendant exercised dominion and control over
the drugs. Id. at 372, 772 P.2d at 902.
633. Muniz, 110 N.M. at 800, 800 P.2d at 735.
634. Id. at 800-01, 800 P.2d at 735-36.
635. Id. at 801, 800 P.2d at 736.
636. Id. at 799, 800 P.2d at 734.
637. Id. at 800-01, 800 P.2d at 735-36.
638. Id. at 801, 800 P. 2d at 736.
639. 110 N.M. 605, 798 P.2d 206 (1990), cert. denied, 110 N.M. 641, 798 P.2d 591 (1990).
640. Id. The court discussed the practices of the Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits.
641. Id. at 607, 798 P.2d at 208.
642. Id.
643. Id.
644. Id.
645. Id.
646. Id. at 605, 798 P.2d at 206.
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was the price of the substance, the secretive nature of the transaction
between Askew and Rubio, and Askew's previous success in selling the
substance. 647 Rubio claimed this was insufficient evidence to support his
conviction.6
The New Mexico Court of Appeals discussed the various types of
circumstantial evidence it generally allows in determining whether a substance is cocaine or not. 649 The court listed the appearance and packing
of a substance, the price of a substance, the manner of use of a substance,
and the effect of a substance on the user as admissible to show a
substance is cocaine. 6 0 The court of appeals further noted that some
jurisdictions allow the secretive nature of a transaction and a seller's
previous success in selling a substance as cocaine to be considered as
circumstantial evidence. 6 1 The court of appeals adopted these standards
in this case.652 The court of appeals also adopted as admissible circumstantial evidence the lay testimony of a drug dealer that what he sold
was cocaine .653 In adopting these standards from other jurisdictions, the
court of appeals broadened the type of evidence that may used to obtain
drug convictions in New Mexico.
Conclusion
During this survey year, the New Mexico Supreme Court and the Court
of Appeals made several significant evidentiary rulings. First, the court
of appeals examined hearsay questions in light of confrontation concerns.654 The court of appeals also reiterated that excited utterance ex655
ceptions to hearsay are not limited according to when they were made.
Second, the supreme court and court of appeals examined issues of
character evidence and held that character evidence is not an element of
self-defense 65 6 and character of the coercer is not an element of the
defense of duress. 65 7 The court of appeals also broadened the prior bad

E.

647. Id. at 608, 798 P.2d at 209.
648. Id. at 607, 798 P.2d at 208.
649. Id. at 608, 798 P.2d at 209.
650. Id.
651. Id. Here, the court noted the practice of the fifth circuit which recognizes as circumstantial
evidence a seller's previous success in selling a substance as cocaine (citing United States y. Eakes,
783 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 906 (1986)). The court also noted the practice
of the fourth circuit in allowing the secretive nature of a transaction to be introduced as circumstantial
evidence (citing United States v. Dolan, 544 F.2d 1219 (4th. Cir. 1976)).
652. Rubio, 110 N.M. at 608, 798 P.2d at 209.
653. Id. The court notes the practice of the eleventh circuit in allowing testimony of a person
with prior experience in the drug trade (i.e., a prior user, seller, or law enforcement officer) to
testify as to the identity of a controlled substance (citing United States v. Harrell, 737 F.2d 971,
(11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1027 (1985)).
654. State v. Pacheco, 110 N.M. 599, 798 P.2d 200 (Ct. App. 1990); State v. Sanchez, 112 N.M.
59, 811 P.2d 92 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Hoeffel, 112 N.M. 358, 815 P.2d 654 (Ct. App. 1991),
cert. denied, 112 N.M. 279, 814 P.2d 457 (1991).
655. State v. Mares, 112 N.M. 193, 812 P.2d 1341 (Ct. App. 1991).
656. State v. Reneau, 111 N.M. 217, 804 P.2d 408 (Ct. App. 1990).
657. State v. Duncan, 111 N.M. 354, 805 P.2d 621 (1991).
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acts exception by allowing an uncharged incident to be admitted as a
prior bad act. 6 8
Third, the court of appeals examined the admissibility of prior convictions and held that crimes over ten years old are admissible if the
defendant mentions them himself, the attorney does not object, and no
69
prejudice is found.
Fourth, the court of appeals held the prohibition against admitting
evidence of insurance does not apply in a criminal case because there is
no danger of prejudice." 0 The court of appeals also held that a witness
may not testify that another witness is mistaken but may make such an
implication.66'
Fifth, the supreme court examined the abuse of discretion doctrine and
held that dismissal may be appropriate in a criminal case where evidence
is lost.662 The supreme court also held it was proper for a lower court
to allow an undisclosed rebuttal witness to testify." 3
Finally, the court of appeals broadened the scope of evidence that may
be used to obtain drug convictions."
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658. State v. Baca, II I N.M. 270, 804 P.2d 1089 (Ct. App. 1990), cert. denied, 111 N.M. 164,
803 P.2d 253 (1991).
659. State v. Reynolds, IIl N.M. 263, 804 P.2d 1082 (Ct. App. 1990), cert. denied, III N.M.
164, 803 P.2d 253 (1991).
660. State v. Flanagan, IIl N.M. 93, 801 P.2d 675 (Ct. App. 1990).
661. Id.
662. Scoggins v. State, 111 N.M. 122, 802 P.2d 631 (1990).
663. Montoya v. Super Save Warehouse Foods, III N.M. 212, 804 P.2d 403 (1991).
664. State v. Muniz, 110 N.M. 799, 800 P.2d 734 (Ct. App. 1990). cert. denied, 110 N.M. 749,
799 P.2d 1121 (1990); State v. Rubio, 110 N.M. 605, 798 P.2d 206, (Ct. App. 1990), cert. denied,
110 N.M. 641, 798 P.2d 591 (1990).

